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THE CAUSAL CONTEXT OF DISPARATE 
VOTE DENIAL 
Janai S. Nelson* 
Abstract: For nearly fifty years, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) and 
its amendments have remedied racial discrimination in the electoral proc-
ess with unparalleled muscularity. Modern vote denial practices that have a 
disparate impact on minority political participation, however, increasingly 
fall outside the VRA’s ambit. As judicial tolerance of disparate impact 
claims has waned in other areas of law, the contours of Section 2, one of 
the VRA’s most powerful provisions, have also narrowed to fit the shifting 
landscape. Section 2’s “on account of race” standard to determine dis-
crimination in voting has evolved from one of quasi-intent determined by 
a totality of the circumstances, to a short-lived intent requirement, fol-
lowed by an enhanced disparate impact analysis, culminating in a more 
recent standard that simulates proximate cause. This Article proposes a 
test for Section 2 vote denial claims that comports with the narrowing con-
struction of disparate impact claims and reclaims the robust contextual 
analysis that the VRA contemplates. The “causal context” test proposed 
here is anchored to “core values” mined from Section 2’s legislative his-
tory, particularly the “Senate factors.” The causal context analysis relies on 
proof of explicit or implicit bias, as well as circumstances internal and ex-
ternal to elections that give rise to disparate vote denial, without requiring 
proof of intent. This approach is historically consistent with the VRA’s to-
tality of the circumstances test and cognizant of courts’ increasing de-
mands for proof of a causal link within disparate impact jurisprudence. 
Moreover, the proposed causal context analysis is consonant with recent 
federal proceedings evaluating the racially disparate impact of voter identi-
fication laws, voter purges, early voting restrictions, and other forms of 
modern vote denial. 
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Introduction 
 President Barack Obama’s historic election and reelection is evi-
dence of the increasing durability and resilience of minority voting 
power. Minority voters participated in the 2008 general election in re-
cord numbers and returned to the polls in 2012 at nearly equal levels.1 
It was dubious that such turnout and participation could recur in 2012 
in light of the legal framework of mutually reinforcing voter identifica-
tion (“voter ID”) requirements, voter purges, felon disfranchisement 
laws, and restrictive voting periods.2 Indeed, the 2008 election that 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 The 2008 electorate was the most racially and ethnically diverse in U.S. history, with 
nearly one in four votes cast by non-whites. Mark Hugo Lopez & Paul Taylor, Dissect-
ing the 2008 Electorate: Most Diverse in U.S. History 3 (2009), available at http:// 
pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/dissecting-2008-electorate.pdf. Moreover, the rise in minority 
voter registration in 2008 narrowed the registration gap between blacks and whites from ten 
percentage points in 2004 to four percentage points in 2008, and black voter participation 
nearly matched that of whites for the first time in history. Id. at i–ii, 4. Overall voter turnout 
decreased from 61.6% in 2008 to 58.2% in 2012. Michael P. McDonald, Turnout in the 2012 
Presidential Election, Huffington Post (Feb. 11, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/michael-p-mcdonald/turnout-in-the-2012-presi_b_2663122. html; see Juliet Lapidos, 
Voter Turnout, N.Y. Times, Taking Note Blog (Mar. 13, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://taking 
note.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/voter-turnout/; Sean Sullivan, The States with the Highest 
and Lowest Turnout in 2012, in 2 Charts, Wash. Post, The Fix (Mar. 12, 2013, at 12:36 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/12/the-states-with-the-highest- 
and-lowest-turnout-in-2012-in-2-charts/. In this most recent election, young and minority 
voter turnout increased as compared to 2008, and young voters were the most racially and 
ethnically diverse segment of the voting population. Nonprofit Vote, American Goes to 
the Polls 2012: A Report on Voter Turnout in the 2012 Election 13 (n.d.), available 
at http://www.nonprofitvote.org/voter-turnout.html. Latino voter turnout increased to 
10% of the general electorate and was even higher in western states such as Nevada, where 
Latino turnout was 18%. Id. at 15. Blacks maintained their 2008 voter turnout rate of 13% 
of the electorate and may have voted at a higher rate than whites. Paul Taylor, The Growing 
Electoral Clout of Blacks Is by Turnout, Not Demographics, Pew Res. Center (Dec. 26, 2012), 
http://pewsocialtrends.org/2012/12/26/the-growing-electoral-clout-of-blacks-is-driven-by- 
turnout-not-demographics/1/; see Nonprofit Vote, supra, at 17. 
2 See, e.g., Keesha Gaskins & Sundeep Iyer, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Chal-
lenge of Obtaining Voter Identification 1 (2012), http://brennan.3cdn.net/f5f28dd 
844a143d303_i36m6lyhy.pdf (assessing the difficulties that eligible voters may face in ac-
quiring photo identification); Jon C. Rogowski & Cathy J. Cohen, Black Youth Pro-
ject, Turning Back the Clock on Voting Rights: The Impact of New Photo Identi-
fication Requirements on Young People of Color 1 (2012), http://research.black 
youthproject.com/files/2012/09/Youth-of-Color-and-Photo-ID-Laws.pdf (reporting that be-
tween 170,000 and 475,000 young black voters, 68,000 and 250,000 young Latino voters, 
13,000 and 46,000 young Asian American voters, 1700 and 6400 young Native American vot-
ers, and 700 and 2700 young Pacific Islander voters might not have been able to vote in the 
2012 general elections because they did not possess the identification required under new 
state laws); Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Voting 
Rights Changes in 2012, at 19 (2011), http://brennan.3cdn.net/9c0a034a4b3c68a2af_ 
9hm6bj6d0.pdf (tracking election law changes in 2011 that impacted the right to vote, in-
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brought the United States its first African American3 head of state and 
the world its first black leader of a non-majority black nation occurred 
under markedly less restrictive voting conditions.4 
                                                                                                                      
 
cluding voter registration and voter ID requirements). Preliminary analyses show that voter 
ID laws had less of an effect on the 2012 election than was anticipated. Suevon Lee, What 
Effect, If Any, Did Voter ID Laws Have on the Election, ProPublica (Nov. 15, 2012, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/what-effect-if-any-did-voter-id-laws-have-on-the-election 
(noting that, although voter ID laws had received the most attention, they would prove to 
be a far less significant problem as compared with limited early voting hours, lengthy bal-
lots, and precinct shutdowns because of Hurricane Sandy). Estimates show that less than 
five percent of provisional ballots in Virginia were cast because of lack of valid identifica-
tion. Id. Likewise, in Tennessee, where new voter ID laws were put into effect in 2012, only 
674 voters filled out provisional ballots due to lack of a valid identification, and the overall 
voter turnout remained consistent with past years. Id. But see Deborah Charles, Complaints 
About Voter IDs, Ballots, Long Lines in Election, Reuters, Nov. 7, 2012, available at http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-voting-idUSBRE8A609820121107 (report-
ing that some Pennsylvanians were turned away at the polls for lack of valid photo ID even 
though Pennsylvania voter ID laws are not in effect). True the Vote recently released a 
report asserting that voter ID laws did not have any negative impact on voter turnout, and 
new voter ID laws may have bolstered voter turnout due to increased voter confidence. See 
generally True the Vote, Report on Voter Suppression in the Elections of November 
2012 (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/127481956/Voter-Suppression-in-
the-Elections-of-November-2012 (summarizing True the Vote’s research and findings). 
This report has been widely criticized as false and misleading. See, e.g., Paul Gronke, True 
the Vote Continues to Print Untrue Things, Early Voting Center (Mar. 6, 2013), http://early 
voting.net/commentary/true-the-vote-continues-to-print-untrue-things/; Rob Richie, True 
the Vote Presents False Findings, Huffington Post (Mar. 1, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://www/ 
huffingtonpost.com/rob-richie/true-the-vote-fudges-numb_b_2785093.html. Critics of the 
True the Vote report revealed that it incorrectly compared voter turnout of eligible voters in 
2008 to registered voters in 2012 to support the claim that voter turnout had not decreased 
in states that passed new voter ID laws. See Gronke, supra; Richie, supra. True the Vote twice 
revised the report to delete the false statistical analysis on voter turnout, but did not revise 
the claims concerning the effect of voter ID laws on voter turnout. See Gronke, supra; Richie, 
supra. True the Vote maintains that the original conclusions in the report are correct. See Rick 
Hasen, True the Vote Comment on Corrected Voter Suppression Report, Election L. Blog (Mar. 1, 
2013, 10:37 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=47938 (reprinting True the Vote’s state-
ment). 
3 Although President Obama is biracial, he self-identifies as an African American. See Sam 
Roberts & Peter Baker, Asked to Declare His Race for Census, Obama Checks ‘Black,’ N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 3, 2010, at A9 (reporting that President Obama designated himself as “Black, African 
Am., or Negro” on the 2010 U.S. Census). 
4 One dozen states, including eight of the eleven states in the former Confederacy, 
approved new voting restrictions leading up to the 2012 election. Election 2012: Voting Laws 
Roundup, Brennan Ctr. for Justice (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
content/resource/2012_summary_of_voting_law_changes [hereinafter Voting Laws Roundup]. 
Kansas and Alabama passed legislation requiring would-be voters to provide proof of citi-
zenship before registering. Id. Florida and Texas imposed significant obstacles for groups 
like the League of Women Voters and Rock the Vote to register new voters. Id.; see also Di-
ana Kasdan, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, State Restrictions on Voter Registration 
Drives 4 (2012), http://brennan.3cdn.net/17c2fc295ef1249450_26m6bt3yf.pdf (discuss-
ing laws governing voter registration drives). Maine repealed its nearly forty-year-old law 
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 On balance, election laws adopted since 2008 comprise a power-
ful, interlocking grid of modern vote denial that is disproportionately 
visited upon racial minorities.5 These restrictions run counter to elec-
tion reform’s general expansion of the franchise and trajectory toward 
increasing electoral participation.6 The disparate impact7 of these laws 
also runs counter to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).8 The VRA 
has played a pivotal role in enhancing racial minorities’ political par-
ticipation and the integrity of American democracy. In the most recent 
election cycle, the VRA blocked restrictive voting laws in three jurisdic-
tions.9 Although these laws did not alter the outcome of elections, and 
                                                                                                                      
 
permitting Election Day voter registration. Weiser & Norden, supra note 2, at 25. Five 
states—Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia—cut short their early voting 
periods amid litigation. Id. Florida and Iowa reversed executive orders and disenfranchised 
tens of thousands of previously eligible voters by barring all ex-felons from the polls. Id. at 
3. Under the previous executive order, 87,000 Floridians would have had their voting 
rights reinstated prior to the 2012 election. Id. Finally, six states—Alabama, Kansas, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin—required voters to show government-issued 
ID in order to cast a standard ballot. Rogowski & Cohen, supra note 2, at 6–8, 11–12; see 
also Weiser & Norden, supra note 2, at 2 (tracking election law changes in 2011 that im-
pact the right to vote, including voter registration and voter ID requirements). 
5 The current president and chief executive officer of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Ben Jealous, observed, “We are living through 
the greatest wave of legislative assaults on voting rights in more than a century. In 2011 and 
2012, more states have passed more laws pushing more voters out of the ballot box than at 
any time since the rise of Jim Crow.” Benjamin Todd Jealous, President & Chief Exec. Officer, 
Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, Keynote Address at First Plenary Ses-
sion, NAACP 103d Annual Convention 5 ( July 9, 2012), http://naacp.3cdn.net/ee144c 
598135908d65_wwm6iyzz7.pdf; see also Rogowski & Cohen, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that 
immediately after President Obama took office, Republican legislatures began enacting new 
voter ID laws that greatly restricted people’s ability to vote). 
6 See generally Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of 
Democracy in the United States (2000) (examining the expansion of suffrage through-
out the history of the United States). 
7 Disparate impact refers to “an adverse, disproportionate impact [that] is brought 
about by decisionmaking criteria or practices that operate to harm individuals on the basis 
of a protected status characteristic” such as race. Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1469, 1473 (2005); see also Black’s 
Law Dictionary 538 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “disparate impact” as “[t]he adverse effect 
of a facially neutral practice (esp. an employment practice) that nonetheless discriminates 
against persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability and that is not 
justified by business necessity”). Disparate impact is discerned through evidence of statisti-
cal disparities. See Foster, supra, at 1513. 
8 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973bb-1 (2006). 
9 See South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203, 2012 WL 4814094, at *17 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 10, 2012) (blocking South Carolina’s amendment to its voter ID laws for the 2012 
elections, but approving it for use beginning in 2013); Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cv-128, 2012 
WL 3743676, at *32 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012) (striking down the Texas voter ID law); Florida 
v. United States, No. 11-1428, 2012 WL 3538298, at *47 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012) (holding 
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turnout among young black and Latino voters remained comparable to 
2008,10 preliminary data suggest that these laws threatened to suppress 
minority voter turnout in measurable ways.11 Despite suggestions that 
voter suppression tactics can trigger a “backlash” increase in minority 
voter turnout,12 these tactics nonetheless violate the VRA’s core princi-
ple—to ensure that the race of a voter has no bearing on his or her 
ability to vote.13 Moreover, the backlash effect does not negate the in-
creased burden placed on minorities’ right to vote even if, ultimately 
and intermittently, minority voters can bear it and elect candidates of 
their choice. 
 Congress’s broad mandate that the VRA provide racial minorities 
“equal access to the process of electing their representatives” and that 
Section 2 of the VRA serve as “the major statutory prohibition of all 
voting rights discrimination” has largely been effectuated through the 
persistent enforcement (and threat of enforcement) of the VRA.14 The 
VRA’s purpose is not only to rid the electoral arena of existing racial 
discrimination, but also to insulate the electoral process from future 
                                                                                                                      
that a decrease in time for early voting from twelve to eight days disproportionately af-
fected minority voters). 
10 See Lopez & Taylor, supra note 1, at 3–4 (stating that minority voters made up an un-
precedented share of the electorate in 2008); Election 2012: Young and Minority Voters Turn Out 
in Levels Close to 2008, Patriot-News (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/ 
midstate/index.ssf/2012/11/election_2012_young_and_minori.html (reporting that minor-
ity voters made up a large portion of the electorate in both 2008 and 2012); see also Richard 
L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown 81 
(2012) (“Whether or not there’s a lot of voter suppression, fear of it and Democratic efforts 
at ‘election protection’ seem to . . . bring out Democratic voters.”). 
11 See Karen Tanenbaum, Voter ID Laws and Blocking Access to the Ballot: New Tools, Old 
Tricks, Leadership Conf., http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/voter-id-laws-and-
blocking.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (stating that the new voter ID laws will have an im-
pact on minority voters’ access to the polls based on a Brennan Center for Justice study); 
Voting Laws Roundup, supra note 4; see also Hasen, supra note 10, at 81 (arguing that fear of 
voter suppression seems to increase Democratic voter turnout). 
12 Ari Berman, How the GOP’s War on Voting Backfired, The Nation (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.thenation.com/blog/171146/gops-failed-voter-suppression-strategy (“We’re still 
waiting on the data to confirm this theory, but a backlash against voter suppression laws could 
help explain why minority voter turnout increased in 2012.”). 
13 See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997); Morse v. Republi-
can Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 193 (1996); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994); Beer v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 131–33 (1976); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
308 (1966). The VRA has its basis in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
14 S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 30, 36 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207, 214. 
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racial discrimination.15 This latter, prophylactic goal underscores the 
VRA’s continuing relevance and the breadth of its reach. However, in 
the midst of palpable retrenchment in the area of voting rights, includ-
ing a pending challenge to the constitutionality of Section 2’s most able 
counterpart, Section 5,16 the VRA has become increasingly feckless in 
defending against laws that disproportionately threaten to frustrate ra-
cial minorities’ right to vote. Key provisions of the VRA have come un-
der assault, in part because of a misguided understanding of minority 
voter turnout and a failure to recognize that unlawful minority voter 
suppression tactics persist despite minority candidate success.17 
 Judicial reticence to acknowledge disparate impact in voting and 
other contexts compounds the weakening force of the VRA in vote de-
nial challenges.18 Equal protection jurisprudence’s notorious ambiva-
lence toward proof of bias (explicit or implicit) sufficient to sustain a 
constitutional violation19 also appears to have infected analyses of the 
VRA. In addition, the advent of modern vote denial measures has coin-
cided with significant constrictions of the disparate impact standard in 
                                                                                                                      
15 Section 2 of the VRA forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a 
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). Section 5 of the VRA requires that certain cov-
ered states and political subdivisions seek preclearance before enforcing “any voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting” in order to ensure that it does not have the “purpose nor 
will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 
Id. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
16 See Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (challenging the constitutionality of Section 
5). 
17 See infra notes 179–199 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 126–173 and accompanying text. 
19 See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1065, 1069–73 (1998) (com-
menting that “the Court’s application of the discriminatory intent requirement has been 
far from coherent” and examining the disparate approaches that are currently used); Dan-
iel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1106–07 (1989) 
(stating that the doctrine of intent actually shifts burdens of proof to allow the judging of 
substantive outcomes consistent with liberal ideology); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional 
Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 287, 294 (1997) (argu-
ing that the U.S. Supreme Court employs such a broad definition of intentional discrimi-
nation that it limits its understanding of the doctrine). 
Moreover, Justice Antonin Scalia’s ominous declaration, in the 2009 Supreme Court 
case, Ricci v. DeStefano, that “the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be 
waged sooner or later” underscores his concerns about the constitutionality of disparate 
impact theory. 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Just one year later, 
however, Justice Scalia authored a unanimous opinion in which the Court stated that its 
“charge is to give effect to the [disparate impact] law Congress enacted.” Lewis v. City of 
Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2010). This ambivalence toward disparate impact theory per-
meates courts’ treatment of disparate impact claims. 
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litigation under Section 2 of the VRA, which expressly prohibits any law 
or practice that denies or diminishes the right to vote on account of 
race.20 Most notably, the role of intent under Section 2 of the VRA re-
mains a vexing question nearly fifty years after the VRA’s inception and 
three decades since Section 2 was amended specifically to omit an in-
tent requirement.21 
 Challenges to Section 2’s constitutionality on the one hand and 
expansive constructions of its reach and remedies on the other have 
confounded courts’ and commentators’ struggle to make sense of the 
provision’s application to modern vote denial. Section 2 has been re-
hashed and deconstructed to such a degree that the provision’s plain 
meaning has become obscured. Proposals concerning the interpreta-
tion of Section 2 include relaxed evidentiary standards, complex bur-
dens of proof, and heightened scrutiny.22 Notwithstanding their indi-
vidual merit, each proposal fails to reconcile the historical context that 
gave rise to the VRA’s passage and anchors its normative goals with the 
increasingly prevalent view that non-intent-based race discrimination 
cannot be remedied in the courts.23 Moreover, a recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decision Ricci v. DeStefano, an employment discrimination case, 
raises challenging questions concerning disparate impact evidence as a 
touchstone for, but not the sole evidence of, racial discrimination.24 
 Ricci’s holding that evidence of statistical disparity is not “a strong 
basis in evidence” to advance a claim of employment discrimination, 
despite contrary language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”),25 potentially informs Section 2’s vote denial jurispru-
dence. Like Title VII, Section 2 relies on evidence of statistical disparity, 
among other proof, as part of its totality of the circumstances analysis.26 
Ricci’s Title VII standard27 and other legal developments have forced an 
overdue grappling with Section 2’s “on account of race” clause, upon 
which every Section 2 claim hinges. This inquiry, in turn, informs the 
overarching question plaguing Section 2: what, other than an intent to 
                                                                                                                      
20 See infra notes 82–102 and accompanying text. 
21 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). 
22 See infra notes 126–173 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
24 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584. 
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
26 See infra notes 58–81 and accompanying text (discussing Section 2’s totality of the 
circumstances test). 
27 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584. 
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discriminate based on race, proves that disparate vote denial is “on ac-
count of race”? 
 This Article responds to that question by identifying two “core val-
ues” of Section 2 that compel a deeper inquiry into what I term the 
“causal context of disparate vote denial.” Mined from the plain lan-
guage of Section 2 and the legislative history of its amendments— spe-
cifically, the “Senate factors” —the core values of Section 2 are based on 
a principle of equality that is both remedial and prophylactic. Reduced 
to their simplest terms, Section 2’s core values are that (1) racial con-
text matters and (2) implicit bias counts.28 As the Senate factors reveal, 
Congress intended to neutralize the effects of past racial discrimination 
in the electoral arena by requiring courts to take account of race when 
evaluating electoral systems and practices. In other words, Section 2’s 
remedial function elevates the importance of racial context as proof of 
causation. Courts must examine the historical racial context of dis-
crimination in which contemporary race-neutral laws operate to de-
termine whether persistent racial inequality interacts with these laws to 
cause disparate vote denial. The second core value of Section 2 that the 
Senate factors reveal is recognition of the complexity of racial discrimi-
nation, in all its forms, including implicit bias.29 In considering evi-
dence of implicit bias in addition to other direct and indirect proof of 
discrimination in voting, courts must demand that disparate vote denial 
be explained in terms other than race to avoid invalidation under Sec-
tion 2. 
 These core values oblige courts to consider disparate impact and 
its causes in broad terms; that is, Section 2 requires courts to take ac-
count of the “causal context” of the statistical disparities that define 
disparate vote denial. Section 2’s dual remedial and prophylactic aims 
are best served when courts evaluate not only statistical evidence of ra-
cial impact, but also the racial context in which this evidence is situated. 
In other words, the aims are best served by taking account of the causal 
context, including evidence of implicit bias. The causal context analysis 
is legally and historically consistent with the impact of race in the elec-
toral process, as well as with recent studies demonstrating that consid-
eration of implicit bias is indispensable to the modern treatment of 
race.30 Contrary to the notion that vote denial claims do not square 
                                                                                                                      
 
28 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
30 See generally, e.g., Implicit Bias Across the Law ( Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith 
eds., 2012) (chronicling, in a series of essays, how pervasive implicit racial attitudes and ste-
reotypes perpetuate the continued subordination of historically disadvantaged groups 
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with Section 2’s jurisprudence, this Article demonstrates that the Sen-
ate factors, which have defined Section 2 claims, are a template for the 
causal context analysis because they rely on expansive evidence of dis-
crimination that includes both explicit and implicit bias.31 
 Recent federal proceedings in Texas, Florida, South Carolina, and 
New Hampshire, where Section 5 of the VRA was used to challenge 
voter ID restrictions and early voting restrictions, also reinforce the 
causal context analysis as the appropriate treatment for disparate vote 
denial claims.32 In those cases, there was a broad inquiry into the elec-
tion laws at issue and the racial inequality in areas external to voting to 
determine the lawfulness of their impact. This Article briefly examines 
these cases to guide its construction of an invigorated Section 2 analy-
sis.33 This Article also proposes a new framework for analyzing certain 
Senate factors by drawing upon disparate impact analyses under Title 
VII.34 Cut from similar cloth, both Title VII and the VRA invite a de-
ductive evaluation of state motives without requiring proof of inten-
tional discrimination. Issued in the wake of narrowing constructions of 
                                                                                                                      
through the legal system); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 
Calif. L. Rev. 969 (2006) (investigating the possibility of using the law as a “debiasing” tool 
to counter implicit bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489 (2005) 
(applying a social cognitive model of implicit bias to Federal Communications Commission 
regulations); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Dis-
crimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 997 (2006) (advancing 
a theory of “behavioral realism” to identify discriminatory motives in Title VII disparate 
treatment cases); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987) (evaluating the doctrine of discriminatory 
purpose in light of the potential for implicit bias); Michael H. LeRoy, Do Partisan Elections of 
Judges Produce Unequal Justice When Courts Review Employment Arbitrations?, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1569 
(2010) (examining how judicial elections impact courts’ review of arbitrator rulings in em-
ployment disputes); Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and 
the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 Mich. J. Race & L. 1 (2009) (analyzing polling places as a site 
for implicit bias). 
31 Implicit bias theory has been summarized and defined as “discriminatory biases 
based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes.” Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamil-
ton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 945, 951 (2006). By its 
very nature, implicit bias is not cognizable by its perpetrator; rather, it operates as a subter-
ranean influence on actions and decision making. See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 322 
(“[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by un-
conscious racial motivation.” (footnote omitted)). 
32 South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *19; Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *32; Florida, 2012 
WL 3538298, at *47; Letter from T. Christian Herren, Jr., Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to J. Gerald Hebert & Stephen B. Pershing 1–2 (Sept. 4, 2012) 
[hereinafter New Hampshire Preclearance Letter], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
105005436/DOJ-New-Hampshire-Voter-ID. 
33 See infra notes 103–125 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 126–173 and accompanying text. 
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Title VII claims, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) new guidelines for age discrimination claims illuminate the 
application of certain Senate factors under the VRA.35 
                                                                                                                     
 Importantly, the causal context analysis does not contemplate that 
all disparate impact will be eliminated from the electoral arena. For 
example, if a race-neutral voting qualification has a racially disparate 
impact because the qualification operates within a context of discrimi-
nation, Section 2 invalidates the practice for as long as the disparate 
impact or the discriminatory context persists.36 Once the discrimina-
tory context is cured, a Section 2 violation can no longer be sus-
tained.37 Section 2’s constitutionality is thus reinforced, because its abil-
ity to remedy disparate vote denial is not unending or unlimited. 
Moreover, although factually rigorous, the causal context test is deter-
minate enough for courts to apply it consistently and for it to inform 
legislatures and election officials prospectively of potential violations. 
The VRA’s role in challenging societal discrimination also should not 
be overstated. The VRA recognizes the existence of societal discrimina-
tion but does not seek a direct remedy for it; instead, the VRA modestly 
aims to immunize the political process from its effects. That is the rub 
that both preserves the constitutionality of Section 2 and makes claims 
under this provision especially challenging to prove. 
 This Article proceeds in three Parts. First, Part I provides a broad 
overview of the VRA as a disparate impact statute.38 Section A begins by 
examining Section 2’s core values.39 Section B then briefly traces the 
evolution of Section 2’s intent standard from its broad origins, to a sub-
sequently narrowed judicial interpretation, to expansive amendments 
that place it within the legal realm of disparate impact, to its current, 
circumscribed form.40 Section C considers recent Section 5 proceed-
ings concerning voter ID and early voting laws as examples of how the 
context of discrimination is integral to the VRA inquiry.41 Finally, Sec-
tion D looks to the Court’s recent disparate impact jurisprudence in 
the area of employment discrimination to inform a constitutionally 
 
35 See Questions and Answers on EEOC Final Rule on Disparate Impact and “Reasonable Factors 
Other Than Age” Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, U.S. Equal Emp. Op-
portunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adea_rfoa_qa_final_rule. 
cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) [hereinafter EEOC Questions & Answers]. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). 
37 Id. 
38 See infra notes 49–173 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 58–81 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 82–102 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 103–125 and accompanying text. 
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permissible evidentiary standard in vote denial claims.42 In particular, 
this Section examines the Ricci decision and identifies parallels between 
the VRA and Title VII to explain how EEOC guidelines may be used to 
apply to certain Senate factors. 
 The Article then proceeds to Part II, which introduces the causal 
context test as a workable analysis for Section 2 vote denial claims that 
complements Section 2’s core values.43 Section A distinguishes existing 
proposals for Section 2 analyses.44 Section B explores the components 
of the causal context test, including the role of implicit bias in Section 
2, the standard of proof for evidence of discrimination external to vot-
ing that produces disparate vote denial, and the analysis of the tenu-
ousness of the state policy.45 The Article concludes with Part III, which 
briefly outlines how the causal context test would apply to modern vote 
denial practices, including voter ID laws,46 felon disenfranchisement,47 
and voter purges.48 
 Importantly, this Article does not go down the inviting and equally 
challenging path of defining the right to political participation or what 
constitutes meaningful participation in the political process. Rather, 
this Article’s focus is on how Section 2 protects the right to political 
participation by casting a ballot on an equal basis as other groups, re-
gardless of race. The Article concludes that, to the extent that a voter’s 
race is predictive of the relative ease or difficulty he or she will face in 
casting a ballot, the causal context test can reveal whether discrimina-
tion is present, and Section 2 can provide a remedy. It further estab-
lishes that, despite current constrictions, Section 2 litigation preserves a 
relevant space for proof of racially disparate impact both internal and 
external to the electoral process, and, consequently, helps to insulate 
our democracy from racial discrimination’s deleterious effects. 
I. The VRA as a Disparate Impact Statute 
 For nearly fifty years, the VRA and its amendments have remedied 
racial discrimination in the electoral process with unparalleled muscu-
larity. The VRA revolutionized minority voters’ access to the political 
process and enabled diverse candidates to compete for leadership and 
                                                                                                                      
42 See infra notes 126–173 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 174–263 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 178–199 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 200–263 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 282–292 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 293–307 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 308–312 and accompanying text. 
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office-holding on scales that were unfathomable prior to its 1965 en-
actment.49 The VRA’s success in this regard is owed largely to its two 
most frequently enforced provisions: Section 2 and Section 5.50 Section 
2 of the VRA provides a remedy within the electoral arena for any vot-
ing practice, procedure, or law that has the intent or effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race.51 Section 5, by con-
trast, is limited to certain jurisdictions with a history of discrimination 
in voting, and prohibits voting changes that (1) are retrogressive, that 
is, that worsen the electoral position of minorities, or (2) are intended 
to discriminate based on race, regardless of effect.52 
 Both Sections 2 and 5 employ disparate impact theory by measur-
ing the effect of a particular election law or practice on racial minori-
ties as compared to non-minority groups.53 Because of Section 5’s lim-
                                                                                                                      
 
49 See Judson L. Jeffries, Huey P. Newton: The Radical Theorist 85 (2002) (“Prior to 
1964, there were 103 black elected officials throughout the United States. That number 
climbed to 1,400 with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”). By the end of the 
1970s, the total number of black elected officials nationwide had more than doubled, to 
nearly 5000. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011, at 
258 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0413.pdf. 
Currently, there are approximately 10,000 black elected officials nationwide. Joint Ctr. for 
Political & Econ. Studies, National Register of Black Elected Officials Fact Sheet 
1 (2011), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/upload/research/files/ 
National%20Roster%20of%20Black%20Elected%20Officials%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf; see also 
Steven Andrew Light, “The Law Is Good”: The Voting Rights Act, Redistricting, and 
Black Regime Politics, at ix (2010) (noting the VRA’s impact in expanding the ranks of 
black, Latino, and Asian elected officials). 
50 In addition, other provisions of the VRA, most notably Sections 4 and 203 (and its 
accompanying provisions), have eliminated significant barriers to political participation. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (prohibiting certain devices such as literacy 
tests as voting prerequisites, providing for the appointment of federal examiners and fed-
eral observers, and establishing the triggering formula for Section 5 of the VRA); Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 203, 301, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb) (requiring translated election materials for certain 
populations). 
51 Id. § 1973a. 
52 Id. § 1973c(a). 
53 See id. §§ 1973a, 1973c(a). Section 2 claims fall into either of two categories: vote 
denial or vote dilution. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets 
the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 691 (2006). Vote denial occurs when an individual 
is prevented from casting a ballot because of a law, practice, or procedure that makes it 
impossible or overly burdensome to do so. Id. Vote dilution is when a person or group of 
persons is permitted to cast ballots, but the ballots are not counted equally with other 
votes. Id. Vote dilution is often framed as a group right to have its votes cast and counted 
equally. Id. 
There are significant parallels between Sections 2 and 5 in the area of disparate impact. 
For example, Section 5’s retrogression standard measures the degree to which minority vot-
ing power is diminished relative to its existing power vis-à-vis whites. Rick Pildes, How Ricci 
Will Affect the Voting Rights Act, Balkinization ( June 29, 2009, 10:43 AM), http://balkin. 
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ited geographic coverage and unique preclearance standard,54 how-
ever, it is not the ideal situs for large-scale disparate vote denial chal-
lenges.55 Instead, Section 2’s nationwide reach, covering all voting-
related measures, makes it especially fitting to address modern vote de-
nial resulting from voter ID requirements, voter purges, restricted vot-
ing periods, stringent voter registration regulations,56 and felon dis-
franchisement, among other voting rights encumbrances.57 
                                                                                                                      
blogspot.com/2009/06/how-ricci-will-affect-voting-rights-act.html (noting that Section 2’s 
prohibition of election practices that result in denial or abridgement of the right to vote on 
account of race and Section 5’s retrogression standard are “a form of disparate-impact law”). 
54 See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 691. 
55 Moreover, Section 5’s constitutionality is the subject of intense scrutiny, as the Su-
preme Court’s 2012 grant of certiorari in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder demonstrates. See 
679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-
96). The Court has avoided the constitutional question in recent cases by incrementally 
dispossessing Section 5 of its full breadth. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Hold-
er, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2009) (declining to decide Section 5’s constitutionality, but stat-
ing that Section 5 imposes “substantial federalism costs” and “current burdens” that “must 
be justified by current needs”); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2009) 
(holding that Section 5 does not require states to maximize electoral opportunities for 
minority voters); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 428 (2008) (resolving conflicting federal 
and state statutory mandates in a Section 5 redistricting challenge in favor of the state). 
For these reasons, it is imperative that Section 2 operate to the fullest extent of its constitu-
tional capacity to remedy and prevent racial discrimination in voting on a national scale. 
Indeed, how well Section 2 can address a variety of voting challenges is an important con-
sideration in the debate about the continuing role of Section 5. 
56 For example, in 2011, Florida legislators enacted H.B. 1355, an omnibus bill of elec-
tion law changes that included severe restrictions and burdensome administrative require-
ments for voter registration, including shorter deadlines for submitting completed registra-
tion forms and stiff penalties for delay or error. See Fla. Stat. § 97.0575 (2011). As a result, 
several civil rights groups ceased conducting voter registration in Florida and successfully 
challenged the laws. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 
1167 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (conditionally granting a motion to enjoin the implementation of 
Florida’s new voter registration requirements). 
57 To date, no federal appellate court has held that Section 2 applies to felon disfran-
chisement, and several have expressly held that it does not. See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 
F.3d 24, 34–36 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Section 2 does not apply to state laws that dis-
enfranchise incarcerated felons); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (holding that Congress made no clear statement of intent to apply Section 2 to fel-
on disenfranchisement laws); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) (holding that Section 2 does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws 
because a contrary holding would conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Wes-
ley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming without holding that the VRA 
applied to Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement laws, but holding that there was no Sec-
tion 2 violation). 
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A. Disparate Vote Denial and the Mechanics of Section 2 
 Modern vote denial is characterized by disparate impact caused by 
discrimination within or outside the electoral arena that is transmitted 
into the electoral arena via election laws, procedures, or practices.58 
Section 2 broadly states that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite 
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a 
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to 
vote on account of race.”59 Section 2 was not always this expansive, how-
ever. In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to address vote dilution 
claims by including the terms “results” and “on account of race” to 
make clear that the provision did not require a showing of intentional 
racial discrimination or discriminatory purpose.60 Instead, plaintiffs 
pursuing a claim under Section 2 could prevail by showing discrimina-
tory effect.61 Importantly, Congress was not focused on vote denial at 
the time of the 1982 amendments, nor was the Supreme Court in the 
1986 case, Thornburg v. Gingles, which was the first case to apply the 
amended standard.62 For this reason, the legislative history of the 
amendments and the seminal cases that followed do not provide much 
guidance on what the test for vote denial should be.63 They do, how-
ever, reveal certain principles that guide the vote denial analysis. 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 691 (describing the set of regulations, rules, and prac-
tices governing the administration of elections that result in the disproportionate denial of 
minority voters’ votes as new vote denial). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
60 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). In 1980, in City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, a plurality of the 
Supreme Court held that Section 2 required a showing of intentional discrimination to in-
validate an at-large election scheme. 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980). The plaintiffs had alleged that 
Mobile, Alabama’s at-large election of its commissioners effectively disabled black voters from 
electing their preferred candidates because blacks were a numerical minority voting in a 
climate of entrenched racial polarization. Id. at 58. The 1982 amendments to Section 2 re-
stored the evidentiary standard established in earlier cases that considered the totality of the 
circumstances and did not require direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See S. Rep. No. 
97-417, at 27–28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. Indeed, the results test that 
was added to Section 2 in 1982 was borne out of a direct response to Bolden. Id. 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). As a result of amended Section 2, plaintiffs need only show 
“that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the juris-
diction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political proc-
ess.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 27. This is expressly distinct from proof that the purpose of the 
system or practice is to discriminate. 
62 See 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). 
63 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1022 (1994); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80. 
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 In Gingles, the Supreme Court clarified that the “essence of a § 2 
claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with 
social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportuni-
ties enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred represen-
tatives.”64 The Gingles Court adopted principles developed by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the 1973 case, Zimmer v. McKei-
then, a Section 2 case, to formulate its preconditions and totality of the 
circumstances analysis for Section 2 claims.65 What emerged was a 
multi-pronged test for Section 2 claims based on a theory of vote dilu-
tion—that is, based on whether an electoral practice resulted in minor-
ity voters having less opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice on 
account of their race.66 The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 
amendments to the VRA also relied on Zimmer and a Supreme Court 
vote dilution case from 1973, White v. Regester, to identify a wide-ranging 
list of non-exhaustive factors that can reveal the racial impact of elec-
toral laws under Section 2.67 The following seven “Senate factors” are 
typical indicia of voting practices that deny minority voters an equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candi-
dates of their choice: 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the 
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the 
members of the minority group to register, to vote, or oth-
erwise to participate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or 
political subdivision is racially polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has 
used unusually large election districts, majority vote re-
quirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting 
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity 
for discrimination against the minority group; 
                                                                                                                      
64 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47; see also Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1022 (holding that Section 2 was 
not violated where, in spite of racial discrimination, minority voters were able to form vot-
ing majorities in several districts roughly proportional to the minority’s distribution in the 
voting-age population). 
65 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36 n.4 (citing Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 
1973) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) 
(per curiam)). 
66 See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
67 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 21–23 & nn.73–76, 79–81 (1982) (citing White v. Regester, 
412 U.S. 755, 766–69 (1973); Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 
198–200. 
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4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the mem-
bers of the minority group have been denied access to that 
process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the 
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimina-
tion in such areas as education, employment and health, 
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by 
overt or subtle racial appeals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have 
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.68 
The Senate Report identified two additional factors that are relevant 
proof in certain cases: 
A. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the 
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the 
members of the minority group. 
B. whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivi-
sion’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to vot-
ing, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.69 
The Senate Report makes clear, and the Supreme Court has affirmed, 
that “there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be 
proved or that a majority of them point one way or the other.”70 The 
Report further states that the “ultimate test” for racial discrimination 
under Section 2 is “whether, in the particular situation, the practice op-
erated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal opportunity to partici-
pate and to elect candidates of their choice.”71 Along with certain pre-
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. at 28–29 (footnotes omitted). 
69 Id. at 29 (footnote omitted) (“A” and “B” indications added). These two factors are 
referred to interchangeably as factors A and B or factors 8 and 9. 
70 Id. at 29 & n.118 (stating that the factors were not intended “to be used[] as a me-
chanical ‘point counting’ device”). 
71 Id. at 30. A violation of Section 2 is established “if, based on the totality of circum-
stances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the 
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation” by members of a pro-
tected class, “in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the elector-
ate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 42 
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006). 
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requisites established in Gingles,72 these Senate factors have become the 
standard mechanism for evaluating Section 2 vote dilution claims.73 
 Although Gingles did not purport to pronounce a broad rule for all 
Section 2 cases, its legal framework has come to characterize Section 2 
more broadly, despite the framework’s ill-fitted application to vote de-
nial.74 As a result, the legal contours of vote denial claims remain woe-
fully underdeveloped as compared to vote dilution claims.75 The devel-
opment gap between Section 2’s vote denial and vote dilution jurispru-
dence can be narrowed, however, if Section 2 is recognized as a 
disparate impact provision and the unique characteristics of modern 
vote denial are incorporated into the Section 2 analysis. The Gingles pre-
requisites, for example, have no bearing procedurally or substantively 
on disparate vote denial claims. As a procedural matter, the Gingles pre-
conditions have no place in the vote denial analysis because there are no 
relevant preconditions to individual vote denial other than voting eligi-
bility, or to disparate vote denial other than eligibility and statistical dis-
                                                                                                                      
72 Gingles involved a challenge by black voters to North Carolina’s state legislative redis-
tricting plan following the 1990 U.S. Census. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34–35. In considering the 
plaintiffs’ claims, the Gingles Court established a tripartite threshold examination of vote 
dilution claims under Section 2 of the VRA. Id. at 50–51. Groups alleging a violation must 
establish that they are: (1) sufficiently large and geographically compact; (2) politically cohe-
sive; and (3) routinely denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice be-
cause of racially polarized voting patterns. Id. If these “preconditions” are met, then the court 
must consider the challenged practice under the “totality of circumstances.” Id. at 43, 50, 79–
80. 
73 See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, University of 
Michigan Law School, 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 643, 675 (2006). 
74 One scholar has noted the Gingles framework’s inefficacy at addressing Section 2 
claims that do not involve redistricting and reapportionment. See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 
709, 721. Vote denial claims (and some vote dilution claims) still lack a standardized litiga-
tion framework. As of 2005, less than a quarter of Section 2 cases addressed vote denial 
claims. See id. at 708–09. Since then, the numbers have not increased significantly. In 2006, 
the University of Michigan Law School’s Voting Rights Initiative issued a comprehensive 
survey of lawsuits raising Section 2 claims for which rulings were available. See Katz et al., 
supra note 73, at 654. The report cited 321 lawsuits in total, of which more than two-thirds 
involved vote dilution claims such as challenges to at-large districts, redistricting plans, and 
majority vote requirements. Id. at 654–57. A remaining seventy-two cases involved chal-
lenges to election procedures or other practices (such as felon disfranchisement, voter 
registration regulations, ballot requirements, appointments, and annexations) that may be 
characterized as vote denial. Id.; see also Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 (“While some may 
disagree as to how to categorize some cases, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of 
Section 2 lawsuits since 1982 have involved claims of vote dilution and not vote denial.”). 
75 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 (“While Gingles and its progeny have generated a well-
established standard for vote dilution, a satisfactory test for vote denial cases under Section 
2 has yet to emerge.”). 
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parities.76 As a substantive matter, of the Gingles prerequisites, only ra-
cially polarized voting is potentially relevant to establishing the causal 
context, but only as part of the totality of the circumstances and not as a 
precondition to asserting a Section 2 claim.77 Although not wholly ap-
plicable to disparate vote denial,78 the Gingles test nonetheless provides 
important tools for litigating and conceptualizing such claims. Racially 
polarized voting and the other Senate factors illuminate the context in 
which specific electoral laws operate, and, more importantly, the degree 
to which race defines that context. 
 The Senate factors are not, of course, limited to examining the 
electoral sphere. The fifth Senate factor, “the extent to which members 
of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such ar-
eas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political process,” looks beyond the con-
fines of elections and is particularly instructive to vote denial cases.79 
Indeed, in Gingles, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of 
the fifth factor, stating that the “essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain 
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical condi-
tions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and 
white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”80 In proving Sen-
ate factor five, “Section 2 plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate in-
tentional discrimination, much less intentional discrimination on the 
part of state actors, to make out a claim.”81 Although the other Senate 
factors are arguably less relevant as direct evidence of vote denial, they 
are nonetheless relevant to understanding the impact of vote denial. In 
                                                                                                                      
76 See supra note 74. 
77 See Kareem U. Crayton, Sword, Shield, and Compass: The Uses and Misuses of Racially Polar-
ized Voting Studies in Voting Rights Enforcement, 64 Rutgers L. Rev. 973, 985 (2012) (“From its 
early constitutional interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that confronting polarized voting behavior is a key to promoting equality in the politi-
cal sphere.”). 
78 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 721 (“The size of minority populations, their geographical 
compactness, and racial bloc voting are irrelevant to measuring the impact of such prac-
tices on minority participation. It is therefore quite appropriate that lower courts have 
mostly disregarded these factors in Section 2 vote denial cases.”). 
79 Id. at 724; see supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
80 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added). 
81 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 724. At least one court has suggested that, other than factor 
five, the Senate factors are misplaced in the disparate vote denial context. See Farrakhan v. 
Gregoire (Farrakhan IV ), 590 F.3d 989, 999, 1005 (9th Cir.) (concluding that the district 
court erred in giving weight to the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence of Senate factor 
seven and Senate factor eight, because both factors are irrelevant to vote denial claims), 
aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (Farrakhan V ); see also 
supra note 68 and accompanying text (listing the factors). 
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other words, if vote denial occurs when none of the other Senate fac-
tors are present, it may still be cognizable on the strength of the fifth 
Senate factor—the inequality external to the electoral system that is 
transmitted into the electoral arena via election laws. If the other Sen-
ate factors are also present, they underscore the impact of the vote de-
nial on the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice 
by establishing the context in which the vote denial operates. 
B. The Role of Intent, Disparate Impact, and Core Values in Section 2 
 Read together, the Senate factors reveal Congress’s intent to evalu-
ate behavior within and outside the electoral context—without neces-
sarily ascribing intent to that behavior—in order to determine whether 
racial inequality exists in the electoral sphere.82 The Senate factors also 
reveal certain ideals that are based on a principle of equality that is 
both remedial and prophylactic in nature. Until now, however, the Sen-
ate factors have been overlooked for what they reveal about Section 2’s 
core values.83 
 The first core value that the Senate factors reveal is that racial con-
text matters in pursuing the neutralization of the effects of past racial 
discrimination in the electoral arena. This value is furthered by taking 
account of race within and outside the electoral arena when evaluating 
electoral systems and practices.84 In other words, Section 2’s remedial 
function elevates the importance of racial context as proof of causation. 
The goal of neutrality in the electoral sphere requires courts to exam-
ine the historical racial context of discrimination in which contempo-
rary, race-neutral laws operate to determine whether persistent racial 
inequality interacts with these laws to cause disparate vote denial. The 
                                                                                                                      
82 See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
83 Senator Orrin Hatch, who presided over the Senate proceedings, was a staunch crit-
ic of Section 2’s amendments, stating that “[t]here is no core value under the results test 
other than election results. There is no core value that can lead anywhere other than to-
ward proportional representation by race and ethnic group.” See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 96 
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269. He further argued that the totality of the 
circumstances standard that the results test compelled, including reliance on the Senate 
factors, guided courts only as to “the scope of the evidence,” but not the “standard of evi-
dence.” Id. That is, the VRA does not guide courts as to “the test or criteria by which such 
evidence is assessed and evaluated.” Id.; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 85 (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (asserting that “the Court has disregarded the balance struck by Congress in 
amending § 2 and has failed to apply the results test as described by this Court in Whitcomb 
and White”); id. at 92–93 (stating that the Court’s opinion “require[s] no reference to most 
of the [Senate factors]” and enumerating the factors that may now be unnecessary). 
84 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (identifying as a relevant factor what is now Senate fac-
tor five). 
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second core value that the Senate factors reveal is recognition of the 
complexity of racial discrimination, in all its forms, including implicit 
bias.85 In considering evidence of implicit bias in addition to other 
proof of discrimination in voting, courts adjudicating Section 2 claims 
must determine that the disparate vote denial can be explained in 
terms other than race to deny a Section 2 challenge.86 
 In addition to its core values, Section 2 is defined, in part, by what 
it is not. Section 2 is not a mandate for proportional representation; 
indeed, it expressly says as much.87 Section 2 also does not demand 
proof of intentional discrimination, which the amendments and their 
underlying proceedings make clear.88 Despite Congress’s categorical 
rejection of an intent standard in Section 2 claims, however, the role of 
intent in Section 2 jurisprudence remains perpetually fraught. Recent 
voter ID, voting equipment, and felon disfranchisement cases evidence 
a perplexing ambiguity among courts as to whether and to what extent 
intent is required in vote denial claims.89 The results test under Section 
2, as well as the retrogression standard in Section 5, however, hinge up-
                                                                                                                      
85 One of the earliest accounts of implicit bias in legal scholarship describes the com-
plexity and universality of racial discrimination as it relates to implicit bias as follows: 
Racism is in large part a product of the unconscious. It is a set of beliefs 
whereby we irrationally attach significance to something called race. . . . It is a 
part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our cul-
ture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the world, 
ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social 
activities. 
Lawrence, supra note 30, at 330. 
86 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63 (plurality opinion). 
87 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) (“[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the popula-
tion.”). 
88 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (noting 
that “Congress made clear that a violation of § 2 could be established by proof of discrimi-
natory results alone”); Old Person v. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (asserting 
that “Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to eliminate any intent re-
quirement with respect to vote-dilution claims”); Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 
557 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting Congress’s statement that the “intent test . . . placed an inordi-
nately difficult burden of proof on plaintiffs, and . . . asked the wrong question” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 Va. L. Rev. 715, 716 (1983) (examining 
what is required to prove a violation under the Section 2 results standard). 
89 See supra note 9 (collecting cases); infra notes 264–312 and accompanying text. 
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on the impact of—and not necessarily the intent behind—the chal-
lenged voting practice.90 
 Section 2’s link to disparate impact arises from the fact that prov-
ing a Section 2 violation does not require a showing of discriminatory 
intent, but only discriminatory results.91 As a practical matter, evidence 
of disparate impact in Section 2 cases serves the dual function of (1) 
affirming the existence of actual vote denial and (2) quantifying the 
racial effect. Tallying or estimating the raw numbers of persons whose 
right to vote is or will be adversely affected can quantify the denial or 
abridgment that results from a particular law or practice. The disparate 
impact—that is, the disproportionate percentage of racial minorities 
whose right to vote is abridged or denied vis-à-vis whites—is evidence 
that the practice’s results are on account of race. 
 The accepted rubric of “totality of the circumstances” tests consid-
ers a host of factors, but neither the existence nor nonexistence of a 
single factor is dispositive.92 Moreover, the Senate factors are con-
structed to require affirmative findings: the presence of one or more 
factors may provide evidence of a violation, but the absence of these 
factors does not mean that no violation exists.93 In theory, the sheer 
weight of a single factor could itself be dispositive. Following the 1982 
amendments, courts were unclear with respect to whether proof of dis-
parate impact is ever enough by itself to satisfy the results test; in other 
words, whether statistical evidence of disparate impact alone could be 
actionable.94 Federal courts have resoundingly held, however, that “a 
bare statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority 
does not satisfy the § 2 results inquiry.”95 Rather, proof of a “causal 
                                                                                                                      
90 The most recent evidence of this in the Section 5 context is the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia’s refusal to issue a declaratory judgment that Texas’s newly 
enacted voter ID law “‘neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color,” or “member[ship] [in] a language 
minority group.’” Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *3 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(2), 1973c(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
91 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
92 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 33–34 (1982) (noting that Congress did not intend to re-
quire that Section 2 plaintiffs prove a majority or any other particular number of factors to 
make out a case), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 211–12. 
93 See id. 
94 See Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 
(9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ortiz v. City of 
Phila. Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
95 Id. (citing cases); see also Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan III ), 359 F.3d 1116, 
1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Smith, 109 F.3d at 595) (arguing that the Section 2 results inquiry was 
not satisfied by a statistical showing of disproportionate impact). 
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connection between the challenged electoral practice and the alleged 
discrimination” is required.96 In short, there must be some evidence 
that the challenged voting qualification causes the disparity. 
 This limitation on the evidentiary power of statistical disparities 
marked a significant doctrinal development in Section 2 jurisprudence. 
The previously unscripted weighing of factors identified either in the 
Senate Report, or independently by the trier of fact as part of the total-
ity of the circumstances test, now has at least one clear evidentiary limi-
tation. In effect, evidence of disparate impact is now muddled with the 
other Senate factors, and no matter how compelling the statistical 
proof of disparate impact, a Section 2 claim cannot succeed without 
more.97 This baseline understanding of the evidentiary limitations of 
disparate impact does little to enlighten the broader inquiry of the role 
of disparate impact in general. 
 There are clues, however, as to what a viable Section 2 test could 
entail. As one scholar has noted, the Senate Report “did not qualify the 
type of discrimination a court should consider under the test—for ex-
ample, a court is not limited to considering ‘intentional discrimination’ 
or ‘official discrimination’ —even though the intent/impact distinction 
and the public/private distinction were both firmly established compo-
nents of constitutional law by 1982.”98 Likewise, plaintiffs can establish 
Senate factor five, which asks whether an electoral practice “interacts 
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the oppor-
tunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred repre-
sentatives,” and which the Supreme Court has described as the “essence 
of a § 2 claim,” without proof of intentional discrimination.99 Indeed, 
the 1982 amendments did not change how intent may be proved, in-
cluding the fact that both direct and circumstantial evidence can estab-
                                                                                                                      
96 Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310; see also Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 
914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“To establish a Section 2 violation, plaintiffs need only 
demonstrate ‘a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and [a] prohib-
ited discriminatory result.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 109 F.3d at 595) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). The causal context test proposed by this Article differs 
from causal connection in that the latter has been interpreted to simulate proximate 
cause, whereas the former reinvigorates the totality of the circumstances test by taking 
account of the full context in which disparate vote denial operates. See infra notes 225–235 
and accompanying text. 
97 See Smith, 109 F.3d at 595; cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (rejecting 
an Equal Protection challenge based on compelling statistical evidence of racial disparity 
in the application of the death penalty due to a lack of evidence of discriminatory intent). 
98 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 724. 
99 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (majority opinion). 
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lish intent under Section 2.100 Rather, the amendments were designed 
to address instances of discrimination even when there is no evidence of 
intentional discrimination. To be sure, although “[a]n impact-based test 
may serve as a prophylactic against intentional discrimination that 
might otherwise seep into the voting process undetected,”101 the test 
may also serve solely to address voting practices with no link whatsoever 
to intentional discrimination in the electoral arena. This distinction un-
derscores that the results test must be distinct from circumstantial evi-
dence of intent, which was already cognizable prior to the 1982 
amendments.102 
C. Section 5 and Disparate Vote Denial 
 Recent federal proceedings challenging voter ID laws in Texas, 
New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia, as well as a proceeding 
in Florida opposing a shorter early voting period, reveal a disparate im-
pact analysis that is consistent with the causal context analysis intro-
duced here.103 Although Section 5’s coverage and scope differ from 
                                                                                                                      
100 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 27 n.108 (1982) (“[D]irect or indirect circumstantial evi-
dence, including the normal inferences to be drawn from the foreseeability of defendant’s 
actions . . . ‘is one type of quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose.’” 
(quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979))), reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. Although the amended act did not include an intent standard 
for Section 2 cases, it did not prevent plaintiffs from successfully proving intent through 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 355 
(E.D. La. 1983) (finding circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate in the exclusion 
of blacks from the Louisiana House and Senate Joint Congressional Reapportionment 
Committee and from a private meeting of legislators and other interested parties where 
the final redistricting decisions were made). 
101 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 720. 
102 See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74. 
103 See supra note 32 (collecting cases). Voter ID laws from Mississippi and Alabama are 
also pending preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). See, e.g., Miss. 
Code Ann. § 23-15-563 (2013). If precleared, Alabama’s requirement for all voters to pre-
sent a photo ID will not take effect until 2014. See Ala. Code § 17-9-30 (Supp. 2011). The 
DOJ has already rejected voter ID laws in South Carolina and Texas. See Letter from Tho-
mas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to H. Christopher Bar-
tolomucci, Bancroft PLLC 2 ( June 29, 2012), available at http://www.slideshare.net/ander 
sonatlarge/justice-department-letter-to-south-carolina-denying-preclearance-of-voter-id-law; 
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Keith In-
gram, Dir. of Elections, Elections Div., Office of the Tex. Sec’y of State 2 (Mar. 12, 2012) 
[hereinafter Texas Objection Letter], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/85051426/ 
DOJ-Letter-To-Texas-On-Voter-ID-Law; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to C. Havird Jones, Jr., S.C. Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen. 
(Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter South Carolina Objection Letter I], available at http://www. 
justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_122311.php. 
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Section 2’s,104 Section 5’s application to modern voting practices that 
have a disparate impact on minority voter participation is nonetheless 
instructive. Both the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
(the “DCDC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have evalu-
ated the impact of certain voter ID and early voting laws on minority 
voter participation pursuant to Section 5’s preclearance standard.105 As 
noted above, unlike Section 2, Section 5 does not prohibit all election 
laws that have a discriminatory effect on account of race.106 Rather, a 
Section 5 violation results from laws that would place minority voters in 
a worse position than the status quo, or that were enacted with the in-
tent to discriminate.107 
 In evaluating voter ID laws, the DOJ and the DCDC investigated 
whether these laws would retard minority voter turnout in upcoming 
elections, resulting in the retrogression that Section 5 prohibits. The 
results were mixed. The DOJ precleared Virginia’s voter ID laws, which 
expand the forms of identification voters can present at the polls, do 
not require photo identification, and require the State to mail a voter 
card to all registered voters prior to the general election.108 Similarly, 
New Hampshire’s voter ID laws were precleared.109 New Hampshire’s 
voter ID laws require photo identification, but permit voters to execute 
a “challenged voter affidavit,” which entitles the voter to cast a regular 
ballot upon affirming his or her identity, ability to vote, and domicile in 
the applicable town or ward.110 These measures eliminate the burden 
                                                                                                                      
104 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006) (describing procedures for proceedings to enforce 
the right to vote under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), with 42 U.S.C. § 1973c 
(describing preclearance requirements for changes to voting qualifications or procedures). 
105 See South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *17; Texas Objection Letter, supra note 103, 
at 2. 
106 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
107 Id. 
108 See Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-643(B) (2012); Letter from T. Christian Herren, Jr., Chief, 
Voting Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joshua N. Lief 3 (Aug. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.ag.virginia.gov/Media%20and%20News%20Releases/News_Releases/ 
Cuccinelli/USDOJ_82012_Ltr_Preclearing_VA_Voter_ID_Law.pdf. Virginia’s new voter ID law 
discontinues the State’s practice of allowing voters to sign an affidavit to attest to their identity 
in lieu of providing the statutorily required identification. See id. 
109 New Hampshire Preclearance Letter, supra note 32, at 2. 
110 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 659:13 (2012) (effective Sept. 1, 2013). A voter may execute 
a “challenged voter affidavit” without notarization or excuse. Id. After September 1, 2013, 
voters wishing to execute a “challenged affidavit ballot” will be photographed at the poll-
ing site, barring religious objection. Id. 
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on voters to obtain the necessary documentation to vote—a burden 
that falls disproportionately on minority voters.111 
 By contrast, South Carolina’s proposed voter ID law requires gov-
ernment-issued photo identification at the polls for a voter to cast a 
non-provisional ballot, and does not provide for meaningful alterna-
tives to photo identification.112 The DOJ denied preclearance on the 
ground that the law discriminated against black voters because they are 
twenty percent more likely than white voters to lack a driver’s license or 
state photo identification card.113 In response, South Carolina brought 
a federal lawsuit seeking preclearance.114 In 2012, in South Carolina v. 
United States, the DCDC precleared South Carolina’s voter ID law be-
cause the state expanded the number of permissible identifications— 
many of which are free and do not require a photo—and, for those 
lacking any form of identification, the state permitted the use of voter 
affidavits.115 The court, however, enjoined implementation of the new 
voter ID law in 2012, stating that voters and voting officials need to be 
educated on the new law before it is implemented in order to avoid a 
disparate impact on minorities.116 
 Similarly, in the 2012 case, Texas v. Holder, the DCDC denied pre-
clearance of Texas’s voting law on the grounds not only that the state 
failed to prove that its law would not have a retrogressive effect on mi-
nority voters, but also that the evidence showed that the law would af-
firmatively disenfranchise minorities and the poor.117 The court rejected 
the argument that, because factors other than race, such as poverty or 
                                                                                                                      
111 See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund., Inc. & NAACP, Defending Democracy: 
Confronting Modern Barriers to Voting in America 32–36 (2011) [hereinafter NAACP, 
Defending Democracy], http://naacp.3cdn.net/67065c25be9ae43367_mlbrsy48b.pdf (de-
scribing voter suppression tactics allegedly intended to combat increasing minority participa-
tion in the electoral process). See generally Gaskins & Iyer, supra note 2 (examining voter ID 
laws); Rogowski & Cohen, supra note 2 (evaluating the potential effects of photo identifica-
tion requirements on young minority voters). 
112 See S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-710 (2011). 
113 See South Carolina Objection Letter I, supra note 103 (finding that “[n]on-white 
voters were therefore disproportionately represented, to a significant degree, in the group 
of registered voters who, under the proposed law, would be rendered ineligible to go to 
the polls and participate in the election”). In addition, the DOJ found “particularly per-
suasive” evidence that the laws were enacted with the intent to discriminate. Id. 
114 See South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *19. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at *17 (preclearing South Carolina’s voter ID law for the 2013 election to allow 
time to educate voters, voting officials, and polling place attendants). 
117 2012 WL 3743676, at *33. Texas filed suit in federal district court to seek preclear-
ance of its voter ID law while it awaited preclearance from the DOJ, which was ultimately 
denied. See id. at *1; Texas Objection Letter, supra note 103, at 2. 
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lack of vehicular access, may proximately cause the disenfranchisement, 
the law did not disenfranchise on account of race.118 The court stated, 
“Never has a court excused ‘retrogression in the position of racial mi-
norities’ because that retrogression was proximately caused by some-
thing other than race.”119 
 Florida’s law restricting early voting was also struck down under 
Section 5 by the DCDC in the 2012 case, Florida v. United States.120 The 
court held that the early voting law disproportionately affected minor-
ity voters and had a retrogressive effect.121 The court accepted evidence 
that black voters use early voting more than white voters,122 and con-
cluded that “Florida is left with nothing to rebut either the testimony of 
. . . witnesses or the common-sense judgment that a dramatic reduction 
in the form of voting that is disproportionately used by African-
Americans would make it materially more difficult for some minority 
voters to cast a ballot.”123 
 The proceedings preclearing voter ID laws, as well as those denying 
preclearance to voter ID and early voting laws, reveal that, in determin-
ing whether such laws pose a retrogressive harm to minority voters, the 
relevant inquiry includes an analysis of factors external to voting and 
the nature of the burden the laws impose. These factors may intersect 
with race-neutral voting laws to produce a disparate impact. For exam-
ple, the context of inequality in Texas would cause voter ID laws dispro-
portionately to burden the right of minorities to vote in the state.124 No 
evidence of intent or purpose was required. Indeed, “[i]nterpreting 
‘purpose’ and ‘effect’ as synonymous would run afoul of th[e] princi-
ple” that all words used by Congress must be given effect.125 The same 
                                                                                                                      
118 Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *33. 
119 Id. at *32 (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141). 
120 2012 WL 3538298, at *47. 
121 Id. In 2011 Florida cut its early voting period from 14 days to 8 days despite the 
popularity of early voting and a lack of evidence of fraud. Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. 
Smith, Florida’s 2012 General Election Under HB 1355: Early Voting, Provisional Ballots, 
and Absentee Ballots 2 (n.d.), available at http://electionsmith.files.wordpress.com/2013/ 
01/lwv-pr-herron-smith.pdf. As a result, less than 2.44 million early votes were cast in 2012, 
compared to 2.66 million in 2008. Id. Additionally, the shortened early voting period dis-
proportionately affected blacks, who comprised more than 22% of early voters despite only 
representing 12.5% of the population. Id. at 2–3. The reduction in early voting in Florida 
contributed to a decrease in early voting from 32% of all votes cast in 2008 to 29% in 2012. 
Nonprofit Vote, supra note 1, at 12. 
122 Id. at *17 (accepting an expert witness’s opinion that this disparity in early voting 
was especially pronounced in 2004 and 2008). 
123 Id. at *26. 
124 Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *31. 
125 Id. 
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logic should hold for practices that result in denial or abridgement of 
the right to vote on account of race in violation of Section 2. 
D. The Evolving Disparate Impact Standard Beyond Voting 
 The years following the 1982 amendments to the VRA coincided 
with a precipitous decline in the Supreme Court’s receptivity toward 
evidence of disparate impact. Most notably, in 1987, in McCleskey v. 
Kemp, the Court held that a litigant alleging an equal protection viola-
tion has the “burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimina-
tion” and that “the purposeful discrimination had a discriminatory ef-
fect” on him or her.126 This was hardly the first time the Court de-
manded evidence of intent.127 In 1976, in Washington v. Davis, the 
Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause only reaches fa-
cially neutral statutes if there is evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion.128 In other words, a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral statute 
must prove both discriminatory effect and the intent to discriminate.129 
 Discriminatory intent requires a showing that racial animus moti-
vated the state action in question “at least in part because of . . . its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group.”130 The plaintiff does not 
need to show that the state acted solely because of the discriminatory 
purpose, only that it was part of the motivation.131 As noted above, 
                                                                                                                      
126 481 U.S. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
127 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
128 Id. (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of race.” (citation omitted)). 
129 See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002) (“To make an 
equal protection claim in the profiling context, [the plaintiff] was required to prove that 
the actions of customs officials (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) were motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.”); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(“To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs must prove that the defen-
dants’ actions had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose.”); Christman v. Kick, 342 F. Supp. 2d 82, 92 (D. Conn. 2004) (“[T]o establish a viola-
tion of equal protection based on selective enforcement, the plaintiff must ordinarily show 
(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) 
that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations, such as race.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Flowers v. Fiore, 239 F. Supp. 2d 173, 178 (D.R.I. 
2003) (“In order to prevail on this claim, [the plaintiff] must present evidence that he was 
treated differently from similarly situated white motorists and that the action taken against 
him was motivated, at least in part, by his race.”). 
130 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Christman, 342 
F. Supp. 2d at 93–94 (“Disparate treatment by itself, not resulting from an impermissible 
consideration or malicious or bad faith intent to injure, is an insufficient basis for an equal 
protection claim.”). 
131 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
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McCleskey further constricts the equal protection claim by imposing a 
requirement of individual harm.132 A plaintiff must show that “the deci-
sionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”133 In this 
way, the McCleskey Court introduced a requirement of causation under 
the Equal Protection Clause whereby a litigant must prove not only sys-
temic discrimination, but also that discrimination occurred in his or 
her particular case.134 Once the plaintiff succeeds in meeting this bur-
den, the state may still rebut the prima facie case with a showing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the state would have taken the 
same action absent the discriminatory purpose.135 
 These cases anchored the principle in the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence that disparate impact or discriminatory effect alone can-
not sustain a constitutional violation.136 Instead, plaintiffs seeking to 
prove discriminatory effect must show “that they are members of a pro-
tected class, that they are otherwise similarly situated to members of the 
unprotected class, and that plaintiffs were treated differently from 
members of the unprotected class.”137 It is nearly impossible not to con-
sider the impact of these intensified limitations on disparate impact 
claims in the context of the VRA.138 Most significantly, recent develop-
                                                                                                                      
 
132 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292. 
133 Id. The McCleskey decision is not without its detractors. See Samuel R. Gross & 
Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 
Mich. L. Rev. 651, 723 (2002) (“McCleskey has been widely criticized, and rightly so. As 
Justice Brennan points out in dissent, there was no real doubt that race did influence capi-
tal sentencing in Georgia; everybody who dealt with the issue in practice knew it and acted 
on that knowledge. The Court denies the obvious.” (footnotes omitted)). 
134 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293. 
135 Id. at 297. 
136 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272–74 (1979) (holding that 
disparate impact, even when the effects are predictable, is not an equal protection violation 
absent intent); Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (noting that “our cases have not embraced the proposi-
tion that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discrimina-
tory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact”); see 
also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (stating that the “requirements for 
a selective-prosecution claim draw on ordinary equal protection standards” and that “[t]he 
claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect 
and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
137 Chavez, 251 F.3d. at 636. 
138 See Pildes, supra note 53 (“Although not framed in precisely this language, dispa-
rate-impact analysis plays a key role throughout all aspects of the VRA, and thus [the Su-
preme Court’s 2009 Title VII disparate impact decision in Ricci] has direct implications for 
the VRA—some obvious, some more speculative.”); see also James McConnell & Lucienne 
Pierre, Reverse Discrimination, Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, Disparate Impact, Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Legal Info. Inst., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-1428 (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2013) (“Employers who must comply with anti-discrimination statutes in rela-
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ments in employment discrimination law indicate a narrowing standard 
for statute-based disparate impact claims, even when Congress’s en-
forcement powers buttress the statutes.139 For those who have tracked 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinions doubting the Equal Protection 
Clause’s congruence with the VRA,140 this development is of little sur-
prise. Nonetheless, the extent to which Ricci v. DeStefano has limited Ti-
tle VII’s capacity to redress disparate impact discrimination and what, if 
any, applicability the decision holds beyond the employment discrimi-
nation context is still an open question. When considered in the con-
text of ever-constricting voting rights claims and within the larger con-
text of the Court’s posture toward disparate impact claims, it is impos-
sible not to draw parallels to the VRA.141 
1. Ricci v. DeStefano and the VRA 
 In Ricci, a majority of the Supreme Court positioned Title VII’s 
disparate impact standard142 squarely in tension with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.143 Ricci centered on the tension between protecting one 
                                                                                                                      
 
tion to the Voting Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and even No Child Left Behind may all 
be affected by the court’s decision, because their race-neutral practices with race-related 
goals may be constitutionally suspect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Girardeau 
A. Spann, The Law of Affirmative Action: Twenty-Five Years of Supreme Court De-
cisions on Race and Remedies 159–63 (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s fractured 
affirmative action decisions). 
139 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593. 
140 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 435 (2006); 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–14 (1995). 
141 Pildes, supra note 53 (recognizing that although Title VII and the VRA are different 
statutes, “it would be foolish to think that the kinds of views and responses of the Court in 
Ricci concerning Title VII’s disparate-impact standard will not find their way into the same 
Court’s treatment of disparate-impact issues under the VRA”). 
142 The centerpiece of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII makes it illegal for an em-
ployer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race,” among other protected characteristics. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Moreover, an employer may not “limit, segregate, or classify 
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual’s race,” among other factors. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
Employers also may not “adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise 
alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race” and other protected char-
acteristics for promotion decisions. Id. § 2000e-2(l). 
143 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593 (refraining from deciding the equal protection claim be-
cause the petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on their Title VII claim); id. at 
594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that the majority’s failure to address the equal pro-
tection claim has postponed the question of “[w]hether, or to what extent, are the dispa-
rate-impact provisions of Title VII . . . consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
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group from the negative effects of racially disproportionate exam re-
sults, and denying the benefits of the same exam results to another 
group.144 The case involved racially disparate results on tests that the 
City of New Haven used to promote its firefighters to lieutenant and 
captain positions.145 The first round of test results revealed that the pass 
rate of black candidates was approximately half the pass rate of white 
candidates.146 Because promotions were awarded only to the top three 
highest scoring candidates, no blacks would be promoted based on 
these tests.147 Public hearings were held on the tests’ disparate impact, 
and the city’s Civil Service Board, deadlocked on whether to certify the 
list of eligible candidates for promotion, ultimately did not certify the 
eligibility of any candidates.148 Firefighters who were eligible for imme-
diate promotion brought suit against New Haven’s mayor, John DeSte-
fano, and other city officials under Title VII and the Equal Protection 
Clause.149 The city defended its actions on the ground that if the results 
were certified, minority firefighters would have brought a disparate im-
pact action under Title VII.150 
 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that “race-based 
action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless 
the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not 
taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact 
statute.”151 According to the Ricci majority, the city’s remedial efforts 
presumptively violated Title VII’s disparate treatment prohibition ab-
sent a valid defense.152 Implicit in the Ricci decision is the notion that 
remedial race consciousness is the equivalent of racial discrimination. 
                                                                                                                      
protection”). This tension between disparate impact and the disparate treatment standard 
has existed at least since the Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact claims in 
1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and later recognized reverse discrimination disparate 
treatment claims by white employees in 1976, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation 
Co. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1976); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435 (1971). 
144 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561–63. 
145 Id. at 561–64. The tests were comprised of written assessments accounting for sixty 
percent of the overall score and an oral assessment accounting for forty percent of the 
overall score. Id. 
146 Id. at 566. 
147 Id. at 564. 
148 Id. at 574. Minority firefighters threatened a Title VII suit if the test results were not 
thrown out. Id. at 562–63. 
149 Id. at 575. 
150 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563. 
151 Id. (emphasis added). 
152 Id. at 585. Notably, the Court did not in fact engage in a disparate treatment analy-
sis concerning the white firefighters. Id. 
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Ricci further suggests that choosing a policy or practice with a less dis-
criminatory impact on minorities is intentionally discriminatory toward 
another population. This false equivalence153 forms the premise of the 
Court’s determination that preventive race-conscious measures are al-
most always illegal.154 Disparate treatment is not, however, the flipside 
of a disparate impact remedy, as the Court suggests. Nor is remedial 
race consciousness the legal equivalent of disparate treatment or re-
verse discrimination as the Court presumes.155 First, the motive under-
lying each of these concepts is not the same. Second, there is no legally 
cognizable, historical context of discrimination toward whites as a 
group. Indeed, the basis for New Haven’s rejection of its test was not 
the majority’s reductionist determination that the higher scorers were 
white; rather, the high concentration of white scorers signaled that the 
test itself might be biased, and, at a minimum, warranted further inves-
tigation.156 
 The Supreme Court’s current reticence toward disparate impact 
claims in employment is not limited to race. In its 2005 decision in 
Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, and its 2008 decision in Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court held that the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) does not require employers 
to prove that their actions creating a disparate impact on the basis of 
age are based on a business necessity.157 Instead, they need only prove 
that the practice is based on “reasonable factors other than age” 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimina-
tion, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 73, 81 (2010) (arguing that “Ricci reflects a doc-
trinal move towards converting efforts to rectify racial inequality into white racial injury” 
and that this results in the “racing” of fairness whereby long-standing, race-neutral best 
practices are viewed, unjustly, with suspicion as racial preferences). 
154 This holding is the end result of a slow erosion of Title VII disparate impact juris-
prudence following the Court’s well-conceived and detailed treatment of disparate impact 
claims in Griggs and other cases beginning in the 1970s. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436; see also, 
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977) (holding that an over-
whelming showing of statistical evidence of disparate impact in an employment setting met 
the government’s burden to prove disparate impact). 
155 See Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 860 
(2011) (“[T]he Court’s shift in Ricci from a ‘good faith’ standard to a ‘strong basis in evi-
dence’ standard is a momentous change in Title VII law, signaling that defendants’ voluntary 
compliance efforts, which raise reverse-discrimination claims under the disparate-treatment 
provisions of the statute, are presumptively impermissible.”). 
156 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586–87. 
157 Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008); Smith v. City of 
Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 242 (2005); see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 & Supp. III 2010). 
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(“RFOA”).158 The Court acknowledged that defendants can establish 
an RFOA defense more easily than proving business necessity.159 This 
signals the Court’s unwillingness to impose stricter burdens of proof on 
defendants to rebut disparate impact findings. 
 Ricci (and, less directly, the ADEA cases) raises two important and 
related questions with respect to future disparate impact claims: (1) 
what is the extent of the state’s ability to exercise remedial power to 
counter the effects of historical discrimination, and (2) what is the 
standard of proof to support a disparate impact remedy? One scholar 
has referred to Ricci’s requirement of proof beyond a racially adverse 
impact—no matter how compelling the impact—as “disparate impact 
‘plus.’”160 Despite its references to legitimate policy justifications, how-
ever, the Court has not specified what evidence beyond impact alone 
would suffice.161 
2. Ricci’s Lessons for Disparate Vote Denial 
 Whether Ricci will have far-reaching effects on disparate impact ju-
risprudence remains to be seen. What is certain is that disparities alone 
will not suffice to support a challenge to government action that pro-
duces a corresponding racial effect.162 Less clear are situations where 
remedying a disparity to the benefit of racial minorities causes no corre-
sponding disparate effect on whites. 
 Although the Court has held that disparities alone cannot justify a 
remedy under the VRA,163 it has failed to address directly whether there 
would be a different outcome in circumstances where there is no harm 
to another group. The Court’s holdings in this regard are rooted in its 
redistricting jurisprudence, which presents a different set of concerns, 
                                                                                                                      
158 Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91. The ADEA’s provision stating that it “shall not be unlawful 
for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where the differentiation is 
based on [RFOA]” superseded the business necessity justification that normally applies 
under the disparate impact burden-shifting framework, placing the burden of persuasion 
as to RFOA on the employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
159 See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 97. 
160 See Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in Race, Reform, and 
Regulation of the Electoral Process: Recurring Puzzles in the American Democ-
racy 17, 26 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011). 
161 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580. 
162 See supra notes 152–159 and accompanying text. 
163 See Smith, 109 F.3d at 595. 
2013] The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 611 
more similar to the employment context than vote denial.164 Indeed, 
the factual and policy contexts of Ricci and the 2010 Supreme Court 
case, Lewis v. City of Chicago, differ significantly from those in vote denial 
challenges.165 In the context of redistricting, like employment, the po-
tential zero-sum calculation predominates, and few, if any, decisions 
stand alone without some consequence on other groups of voters.166 For 
example, drawing voters into one district versus another may potentially 
impact the electability of one group’s preferred candidate versus an-
other group’s. By contrast, in a disparate vote denial context—for ex-
ample, invalidating a discriminatory voter ID provision or a felon disen-
franchisement law, or preventing a voter purge that yields disparate ra-
cial results based on unsubstantiated criteria—the disparate impact 
claim will not visit negative consequences on any racial group. Unlike in 
the employment context, vote denial challenges do not involve the allo-
cation of a limited resource; rather, the right to vote can be extended to 
countless individuals without denying others access to that right.167 
 To be sure, the individual and collective right to vote can be ad-
versely impacted when the franchise is extended impermissibly. Voting 
power is diluted when unlawful votes are cast. With respect to modern 
vote denial measures such as voter ID laws and excessive voter purge 
practices, however, proof of unlawful voting is negligible or non-
existent.168 Felon disenfranchisement, though recognized in the U.S. 
Constitution,169 may nonetheless be held unconstitutional for inten-
                                                                                                                      
164 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
165 130 S. Ct. at 2195–96; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580. 
166 Cf. Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1341, 1342 
(2010) (arguing that Title VII “requires employers and public officials to classify the work-
force into racial categories and then allocate social goods on the basis of that classification”). 
Professor Richard Primus has noted that disparate impact doctrine could avoid unconstitu-
tionality by adopting a “visible-victims reading” of disparate impact law. See id. at 1369 (assert-
ing that, as long as a race-conscious measure does not “visibly burden specific innocent par-
ties,” it is less likely to produce a divisive social meaning and be found unconstitutional). By 
this measure, Section 2’s application to most voting restrictions would be constitutionally 
sound, as there are no identifiable “victims” in restoring or protecting the franchise. 
167 Certainly, the partisan dimensions of vote denial cannot be ignored and may be as 
significant a force in the design and enforcement of these practices as any other. See 
Rogowski & Cohen, supra note 2, at 3. Regardless of the motivation behind vote denial 
laws and practices, however, if the effect is to visit disenfranchisement disproportionately 
upon minority voters, such laws may nonetheless violate the VRA. 
168 See generally Lorraine C. Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud (2010) (arguing 
that incidents of deliberate voter fraud are rare). 
169 See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 2; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41–53 (1974) 
(discussing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s allowance of vote denial based on a 
felony conviction). 
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tional racial discrimination and other constitutional violations without 
an adverse impact on non-felons’ right to vote.170 Accordingly, remedy-
ing the disparate impact of many modern vote denial practices imposes 
no harm on other voters.171 
 Nonetheless, the potential conflict between the Constitution and 
Title VII’s disparate impact standards that Ricci signals cannot be ig-
nored. Indeed, the Court has issued the same warning with respect to 
the VRA.172 The Court’s trajectory on both fronts suggests an outlook 
that laws that prohibit disparate impact “are constitutional only if those 
impacts can be shown to reflect a racially-discriminatory purpose.”173 At 
a minimum, Ricci suggests that the Court will construe statutory dispa-
rate impact provisions more narrowly to evade constitutional conflicts 
unless it can identify a satisfactory causal link between the challenged 
conduct and the disparate harm. The causal context test proposed be-
low would enable plaintiffs to establish this link under Section 2. 
II. The “Causal Context”: A Disparate Vote Denial Test 
 The inherent challenge in litigating disparate vote denial claims is 
reconciling the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate that such claims be 
proved with evidence beyond disparate impact, with Section 2’s clear 
exclusion of an intent requirement. Determining what plaintiffs must 
show to succeed on a disparate vote denial claim therefore forces a 
deeper examination of the Senate factors and their purpose, while vigi-
lantly protecting against the reinsertion of an intent requirement. As 
                                                                                                                      
170 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1978) (holding that a facially neutral 
law disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude violated Equal 
Protection because the law was motivated by a desire to discriminate against minorities); see 
also NAACP, Defending Democracy, supra note 111, at 12, 25–27 (explaining that these 
restrictions will have a disproportionate burden on minorities because African Americans 
and Latinos suffer disproportionate rates of criminal conviction). See generally Janai S. Nelson, 
The First Amendment, Equal Protection and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 Fla. L. 
Rev. 111 (2013) (engaging the equality principles of the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause to reconsider the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement as a form of 
viewpoint discrimination). 
171 But see Roger Clegg, The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Bartlett and NAMUDNO, 
2008–2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 35, 39 (arguing that “whenever the government bans actions 
(public or private) that merely have racially disparate impact, . . . . actions that are perfectly 
legitimate will be abandoned,” or “surreptitious—or not so surreptitious—racial quotas will 
be adopted so that the action is no longer racially disparate in its impact”). 
172 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. 
173 Pildes, supra note 53 (“[I]t would be unconstitutional for Congress to make dispa-
rate impacts illegal if they cannot be shown to reflect an underlying discriminatory pur-
pose. That is, impact can be looked to . . . as evidence of purpose. . . . But impact alone 
cannot be a constitutional basis for making a state law/practice illegal.”). 
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noted above, the text of Section 2 and its legislative history provide im-
portant guidelines for formulating a test for disparate vote denial.174 By 
prohibiting voting qualifications and other election practices that “re-
sult[] in a denial or abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of 
race or color, or [status as a language minority],”175 Section 2 not only 
makes clear on its face that it applies equally to vote denial claims, but 
also establishes that the focus of the inquiry is on the result of the chal-
lenged law’s application and not its cause or intent.176 Neither the text 
nor the legislative history of Section 2, however, provides specific direc-
tives for litigating vote denial claims.177 Accordingly, against a backdrop 
of ambitious academic proposals and judicial skepticism concerning 
disparate impact, I propose the causal context test as a new formulation 
for evaluating disparate vote denial claims. 
A. Existing Proposals for Disparate Vote Denial Tests 
 Over time, there has been a battery of proposals for Section 2 vote 
denial tests derived from Section 2 cases, the language of the statute, 
and evidentiary considerations.178 One detailed treatment of these 
proposals identifies two categories of tests— “causation and impact-
plus”179 and “inverse relation”180—and introduces an additional one, 
which I refer to as “prerequisites and burden-shifting.”181 The causation 
                                                                                                                      
 
174 See supra notes 82–102 and accompanying text. 
175 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). 
176 See id.; see also Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 (“The language of Section 2 indicates 
that the results standard applies to vote denial claims as well as vote dilution claims.”). 
There was never any question that Section 2’s totality of the circumstances analysis applied 
to vote denial claims. The application became dubious, however, when vote dilution stan-
dards were awkwardly grafted onto vote denial claims. Id. 
177 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 (“The legislative history of the 1982 amendments . . . 
provides little guidance on how Section 2 should apply to practices resulting in the dispro-
portionate denial of minority votes. That is mainly because Congress, especially the Senate, 
focused so intently on representation rather than participation.”). 
178 See id. at 718–23 (discussing previously proposed Section 2 vote denial tests). 
179 Id. at 722 (labeling cases that require more than just disparate impact as “causation 
and impact-plus tests”). 
180 See Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access Theory 
for Interesting Times, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1171, 1197 & n.109 (2001) (collecting fair housing 
cases and scholarly opinions that the author considers “highly instructive” for VRA disparate 
impact analysis). 
181 Specifically, the prerequisites and burden-shifting test operates as follows: 
[A] plaintiff should be required to show both (1) that the practice challenged 
results in the disproportionate denial of minority votes (i.e., that it has a dis-
parate impact on minority voters); and (2) that this disparate impact is trace-
able to the challenged practice’s interaction with social and historical condi-
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and impact-plus test is “a sort of under-the-table balancing of the gov-
ernment’s interest in the challenged practice against its vote-denying 
impact” that “allow[s] judges to consider the justifications the govern-
ment proffers for adopting or keeping the voting practice in ques-
tion.”182 This test is also referred to as “disparate impact-plus,” and tac-
itly relies on proximate cause to justify a finding of liability. 
 The inverse relation test borrows from Fair Housing Act jurispru-
dence, and proposes that vote denial claims be determined as follows: 
“The more severe the racial disparity of voting access that results from a 
challenged practice, the more tenuous the justification should be seen 
to be, even if that justification is asserted to have nothing to do with 
race.”183 This proposal modifies the “causation and impact-plus” test by 
squarely establishing an inverse relationship between the tenuousness 
of the justification and the racial disparity that the challenged practice 
causes.184 
 In the case of the prerequisites and burden-shifting test—the most 
compelling of these tests—the burden shifts to the defendant once dis-
parate impact has been established, on the theory that state actors “are 
in the best position to explain why they believe vote-denying practices 
are necessary to achieve some vital interest.”185 The test also incorpo-
rates certain standards from the equal protection jurisprudence devel-
oped in jury discrimination cases.186 In particular, it relies on the bur-
den-shifting model in jury selection cases as further support for incor-
porating this framework in disparate vote denial cases.187 
                                                                                                                      
tions. These might be thought of as “preconditions” to Section 2 vote denial 
claims, analogous to the three Gingles preconditions for Section 2 vote dilu-
tion claims. . . . 
. . . . 
 Once the plaintiff[] make[s] a prima facie disparate-impact case by pro-
ducing evidence of the[se] two elements . . . the burden should shift to the 
defendant to justify the challenged practice. . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . [T]he government should be required to show the challenged practice 
is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. 
Tokaji, supra note 53, at 724–26 (footnote omitted). 
182 Id. at 722. 
183 Pershing, supra note 180, at 1199. 
184 See id. at 1197 & n.109. 
185 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971)). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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 Like the causation and impact-plus and inverse relation tests, the 
prerequisites and burden-shifting test invites the wrong query. First, if 
an electoral practice does not directly cause a disparate impact, it is less 
relevant whether the law is narrowly tailored.188 The argument is not 
that the state could apply a particular election law in a manner that is 
less discriminatory. Rather, the argument is that the law, which may be 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, com-
bines with social conditions external to voting to produce an unlawful 
discriminatory result. The result is discriminatory because the disparate 
impact would not have occurred but for the race of the voter. Put an-
other way, if the voters were of a different race, the denial would not 
have occurred to the extent that it has, and there would be no (or per-
haps less) disparate impact. 
 Second, although the state’s burden to proffer a compelling inter-
est is high, the state is likely to meet this burden in certain disparate 
vote denial contexts. For example, in the case of felon disenfranchise-
ment, courts are likely to find the state’s interest compelling in light of 
the Supreme Court’s unwavering reliance on Section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as support for states’ abil-
ity to deny the right to vote based on felon status.189 A similar, but less 
certain, argument could be made with respect to voter ID statutes in 
light of the Supreme Court’s 2008 holding, in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board, that states have a right to protect against fraud in elec-
tions even when the only proof of fraud originated from outside the 
state.190 Accordingly, the muscle of the prerequisites and burden-
shifting test may be undermined with respect to certain categories of 
vote denial claims, and potentially all vote denial claims in light of 
states’ broad constitutional authority to regulate the time, place, and 
manner of elections.191 
 Third, by minimizing plaintiffs’ burden of proof through the use 
of prerequisites, the test leaves plaintiffs in a substantially weaker posi-
tion in presenting proof to counterbalance the state’s interest. Even 
with the highest scrutiny applied to defendants’ justifications, plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                      
188 The tenuousness of the state’s policy for the challenged practice, however, is rele-
vant. See infra notes 248–263 and accompanying text. The narrow tailoring of a law could 
be relevant to the evaluation of its tenuousness. 
189 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that the disenfranchise-
ment of convicted felons did not deny equal protection); see also Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 
F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972) (casting doubt on the policy justifications for felon disfran-
chisement statutes). 
190 See 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008). 
191 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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presenting evidence limited to (1) disparate impact, or (2) traceability 
to a social condition external to the electoral process, will not have 
availed themselves of the full breadth of the totality of the circum-
stances analysis. As one scholar has noted with respect to the strict scru-
tiny applied to the state’s justifications, this “high standard tracks that 
of constitutional race discrimination claims.”192 Thus, the test threatens 
to import an intent standard by permitting states to offer justifications 
for discriminatory impact rather than requiring states to demonstrate 
that the resulting disparate impact is not on account of race—by show-
ing, for example, that race merely correlates with, but does not cause, 
the disparate impact. 
 Moreover, the prerequisites and burden-shifting test leaves unan-
swered the question of how to prove discrimination external to voting 
in a manner that satisfies Section 2. If plaintiffs make too cursory a 
showing of Senate factor five as a prerequisite, they risk having inade-
quate evidentiary support for their claims. The test’s burden-shifting 
and strict scrutiny standard tempers this result.193 The Crawford Court, 
however, dismissed strict scrutiny in connection with equal protection 
claims in a decision postdating this proposal.194 Crawford virtually elimi-
nates any prospect of the Court adopting this standard in connection 
with Section 2. 
 Finally, similar to the causation and impact-plus and inverse rela-
tion tests, the narrow focus on disparate impact and Senate factor five 
diminishes the importance of other potentially relevant Senate factors, 
such as the tenuousness of the state’s policy and other contextual fac-
tors.195 Moreover, each of the tests predate the Supreme Court’s 2009 
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit’s 2010 decision in Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan IV )— 
both of which greatly temper expectations of the Court’s willingness to 
impose significant burdens of proof on the states.196 
                                                                                                                      
 
192 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 726. 
193 See supra notes 178–192 and accompanying text. 
194 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188. Indeed, the Court’s apparent readiness to disregard the 
significance of the other Senate factors as pertinent only to vote dilution and not to vote 
denial claims concedes too much. See id. It denies plaintiffs the opportunity to prove the 
larger context of bias in which these facially neutral practices operate, so that overarching 
concerns of fairness and bias can be taken into account. 
195 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 (suggesting that “[u]nlike most of the other Senate 
factors, [Senate factor B] seems quite germane to vote denial cases because of its focus on 
‘qualification[s]’ and ‘prerequisite[s]’ to voting, among other things”). 
196 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009); Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan 
IV ), 590 F.3d 989, 1016 (9th Cir.), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Farrakhan V ). Although Ricci’s reach beyond the employment context is still 
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 More recently, however, one scholar has introduced a Section 2 
analysis that relies on proof of a “significant likelihood” of race-biased 
decision making by majority-group actors that results in denying minor-
ity voters an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.197 
On the strength of Section 2’s legislative history and constitutional con-
text, this proposal states that: (1) Section 2 provides causes of action 
against both participation and dilution injuries; (2) an injury within the 
meaning of Section 2 arises only when political inequalities are due to 
race-biased decision making; and (3) plaintiffs, although not required 
to prove race-biased decision making by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, must nonetheless show “to a significant likelihood” that the in-
jury of which they complain resulted from race-biased decisions.198 In 
brief, the significant likelihood test investigates the role that race plays 
in one’s ability to cast a vote. If a voter were white, would he or she face 
the same barriers to the same degree? If the answer is no, then it would 
appear that the voter has succeeded in showing “to a significant likeli-
hood” that the injury of which he or she complained resulted from 
race-biased decisions.199 The significant likelihood test endeavors to 
strike a different evidentiary balance than the other tests and largely 
succeeds. However, the test still requires some showing of racial bias 
which threatens to read intent back into Section 2 even if the standard 
of proof is less burdensome. 
B. The Theory of Causal Context 
 The tests and proposals referenced above are a certain improve-
ment upon the general ambiguity that surrounds vote denial claims in-
volving statistical disparities and evidence of bias. However, what I have 
termed the “causal context” test—not to be confused with the causal 
                                                                                                                      
unknown, it provides some indication of the Court’s waning receptivity to disparate impact 
claims based on race. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593. Accordingly, since the prerequisites and bur-
den-shifting test relies in part on the Title VII burden-shifting framework, it is important to 
note that although the test is still valid, Ricci may undermine the soundness of its reliance 
on Title VII jurisprudence. See id.; Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 (“Just as employers in Title 
VII cases must show that a challenged employment practice is justified by a ‘business ne-
cessity,’ state and local election officials would have to show that a challenged voting prac-
tice is justified by an ‘electoral necessity’ once a prima facie disparate-impact case has been 
made.”). 
197 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitu-
tional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377, 417, 425–29 (2012). 
198 Id. at 417. 
199 See id.; see also Foster, supra note 7, at 1474 (using disparate impact as a proxy for in-
tent to determine “whether an adverse decision or outcome more likely than not resulted 
from the influence of indicia historically associated with status-based discrimination”). 
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connection standard, which simulates proximate cause200—demands a 
“softer” causal link than causal connection and continues to consider 
racial bias external to voting as envisioned by the Senate factors. Indeed, 
the causal context test proposed here recognizes that modern-day vot-
ing discrimination is contextual if nothing else. Causal context recog-
nizes that a neutral voting practice or procedure can exist within a con-
text of racial inequality and implicit bias that produces a discriminatory 
result in the electoral arena. The fact that the causal context does not 
require direct causation also recognizes that the nexus between the 
harm and the instrument is not necessarily linear. Rather, the causal 
context threads together coexisting and mutually reinforcing factors 
that transport racial inequality in society into the election arena. Put 
another way, when racial disparities in voting cannot be explained in 
race-neutral terms, there is a potential VRA violation. The familiar air of 
this test to those well-acquainted with Section 2 is not coincidental. 
Causal context derives from the Senate factors and the core values they 
reflect, and updates Section 2’s totality of the circumstances test by ex-
pressly including a broader range of evidence of discrimination— 
namely, implicit bias.201 
 For example, an electoral practice denies or abridges the right to 
vote on account of race in violation of Section 2 if it produces a dispa-
rate impact because of racial inequality outside the electoral arena that 
interacts with the practice to reproduce racial disparities within the 
electoral arena.202 This differs procedurally from the current standard 
                                                                                                                      
 
200 Before an en banc decision ultimately vacated the judgment in Farrakhan IV, a panel 
of the Ninth Circuit defined the causal connection standard for Section 2 claims challenging 
felon disenfranchisement as a but-for connection between the election law and the disparate 
impact that results from intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system. See Farra-
khan v. Washington (Farrakhan II ), 338 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003). This definition was 
based on the district court’s holding that evidence “that African, Hispanic and Native Ameri-
cans are targeted for prosecution of serious crimes and . . . overrepresented in prison popu-
lations” may “establish a causal connection between Washington’s disenfranchisement 
scheme and the denial of voting rights to racial minorities.” See Farrakhan v. Locke (Farra-
khan I ), 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Wash. 1997); see also Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the 
City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306, 309–10 (3d Cir. 1994) (relying on a causal 
connection analysis to hold that purging statutes allowing the removal of inactive voters from 
registration lists did not violate the Voting Rights Act). 
201 See supra notes 58–81 and accompanying text. 
202 The impact must be statistically significant. See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 n.251 
(proposing that “where the differential impact of a voting procedure is relatively slight,” 
courts may “requir[e] that any disparities be statistically significant and . . . impos[e] a 
lower burden of justification on the state where the racial disparity is de minimis”). This 
requirement is inherent in the finding of a disparate, as opposed to a different, impact. To 
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by recognizing that proof of disparate impact may serve as a threshold 
showing, effectively replacing the prerequisites in vote dilution cases 
established by the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Thornburg v. 
Gingles.203 This inquiry is analytically distinct from an inquiry into 
whether the policy itself is race neutral or whether the state’s justifica-
tions are insufficient. Instead, plaintiffs must offer proof to permit the 
court to make an independent finding that racial inequality has per-
meated the electoral arena. Inequality that is transported into elections 
is potentially discriminatory and cannot be explained in terms other 
than race, regardless of whether the bias is implicit or explicit. 
 Unlike the other tests, causal context follows the existing prece-
dent that Section 2 requires more than statistical proof of disparate im-
pact,204 yet it does not upend the totality of the circumstances analysis, 
replace it with a balancing test, or overvalue the tenuousness factor. 
Rather, causal context recognizes the relevance of Senate factor five 
without overstating its weight or displacing the potential relevance of 
other factors.205 Other Senate factors and considerations may be rele-
vant in disparate vote denial cases, and courts should consider each 
factor in light of the unique circumstances of the case. Likewise, consis-
tent with Section 2’s totality of the circumstances analysis, compelling 
evidence of one Senate factor could prove outcome-determinative.206 
For example, if plaintiffs proffer compelling evidence that a law or sys-
tem of laws results in the racially discriminatory deprivation of minori-
ties’ right to vote, that abridgment suffices to prove the claim. Other, or 
additional, evidence supporting alternative factors that are of less rele-
vance to the plaintiffs’ claim are superfluous. 
                                                                                                                      
ensure that the impact is indeed measurable and meaningful, however, I have included a 
requirement of statistical significance. 
203 See supra notes 58–81 and accompanying text (discussing the Gingles prerequisites). 
204 See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 
595 (9th Cir. 1997); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358–59 (4th Cir. 1989). 
205 See Farrakhan IV, 590 F.3d at 1004. 
Although the district court was required to consider the “totality of the cir-
cumstances,” not all of the Senate Factors were equally relevant, or even nec-
essary, to that analysis in this case. Some Senate Factors may be relevant as 
circumstantial evidence with respect to certain vote denial claims, but proof 
of those Factors was not required where, under Factor 5, Plaintiffs provided 
strong, indeed “compelling,” direct evidence of the alleged violation. 
Id. 
206 See id. 
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1. The Role of Implicit Bias 
 Some of the potentially relevant evidence in the causal context 
analysis is proof of implicit bias. As noted above, the Senate factors re-
veal that evidence of implicit bias can be used to prove racial discrimi-
nation both within and outside the electoral arena for purposes of es-
tablishing disparate vote denial.207 Implicit bias refers to discrimination 
that occurs unintentionally based on assumptions and prejudices that 
operate beneath the actor’s radar of cognition.208 As commentators 
have noted, implicit bias acknowledges that “‘[m]any mental processes 
function implicitly, or outside conscious attentional focus,’ including 
attitudes and stereotypes.”209 Recent studies of implicit bias within the 
law, and the electoral process in particular, may prove to be a game 
changer for disparate impact claims in voting and beyond.210 Implicit 
bias evidence provides an important window into the pernicious ves-
tiges of de jure discrimination that can easily fall off the legal radar. 
 In 2006, in the vote dilution case, League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), the Supreme Court gave a nod to the eviden-
tiary potential of implicit bias in the electoral arena.211 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited as potential proof of discrimi-
nation the contextual evidence that new rules were enacted just as mi-
nority voters were gaining sufficient political power to potentially influ-
ence the outcome of elections.212 Justice Kennedy noted, with suspicion, 
that when the Latino community in Texas’s District 23 was poised to ex-
ercise the newfound political power that its increased population had 
fueled, the State sought to redraw the district to decrease the number of 
                                                                                                                      
207 See supra notes 82–102 and accompanying text. 
208 See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 319. 
209 Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Dis-
crimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 83, 102 (2008) 
(quoting Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 31, at 947–48). Professor Ivan Bodensteiner de-
fines “attitude” as “an ‘evaluative disposition,’ such as a ‘tendency to like or dislike,’” and 
notes that “one’s implicit attitudes may differ from ‘explicit attitudes’ toward the same sub-
ject.” Id. 
210 See supra note 30. Despite the recency of many implicit bias studies, the application 
of implicit bias is not anachronistic in Section 2 analyses. As this Subsection of the Article 
explains, certain Senate factors are premised on the concept of implicit or unconscious 
bias. To be sure, there is certainly more work to be done in understanding the potential 
role of implicit bias in disparate impact claims generally and Section 2 claims specifically as 
courts are increasingly skeptical about claims of general societal discrimination. Impor-
tantly, the implicit biases recognized by the Senate factors are rooted in a particular con-
text and carefully connect to specific racial disparities. 
211 See 548 U.S. 399, 442 (2006). 
212 Id. at 440. 
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Latinos in it.213 Texas’s redrawing of District 23’s boundaries, which ex-
cluded sizeable portions of its Latino community, took “away the Lati-
nos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.”214 One 
scholar has argued that Justice Kennedy’s analysis in LULAC may not 
hinge upon racial discrimination per se and has suggested instead that 
“the State may have intentionally discriminated in a way that is constitu-
tionally actionable because it intended to deprive the group of an elec-
toral opportunity. The intent that matters is the intent to cause a par-
ticular effect: the intent to burden.”215 This view focuses on “representa-
tional rights,” such as the right to vote and burdens on political 
participation, as opposed to racial discrimination.216 Indeed, it appears 
that Justice Kennedy may have been intimating a broader concern 
about state infringement on group political power when race looms 
prominently in the background.217 
 Alternatively, LULAC may simply be rereading intent into Section 2 
by equating the state’s actions with proof of intentional discrimina-
tion—the intent to burden.218 The causal context analysis suggests, 
however, that without expressly characterizing it as such, the Court ef-
fectively determined that the contextual evidence of Texas’s redistrict-
ing was proof of Senate factor B, which evaluates the tenuousness of the 
state policy.219 This would be perfectly consistent with the Court’s hold-
ing that Texas violated Section 2, and it reflects a more expansive con-
sideration of the context in which discriminatory state action occurs. 
                                                                                                                      
213 Id. 
214 Id. (“This bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal 
protection violation.”). 
215 Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1185, 
1208 (2007). 
216 See id. at 1196–1202. The notion of representational rights derives in part from Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, where, in 
discussing the relevance of the First Amendment in the political gerrymandering context, he 
noted that “[t]he inquiry is not whether political classifications were used[,] . . . . [but] in-
stead is whether political classifications were used to burden a group’s representational 
rights.” See 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Charles, supra note 215, at 1201 (“In constitutional law there are types of State justifications 
that cannot justify certain types of burdens upon groups or individuals; these impermissible 
justifications are sometimes referred to as exclusionary reasons.”) (citing Richard H. Pildes, 
Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 Hastings L.J. 711, 
712 (1994) (arguing that courts rely on a qualitative process to balance incommensurable 
concepts such as individual rights and state interests)). 
217 See Charles, supra note 215, at 1200–02. 
218 See id. at 1207–08. 
219 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 442; supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing Senate 
factor B). 
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Had the Court employed a causal context analysis in LULAC, it would 
have stated expressly that the evidence of burgeoning Latino political 
power and the lack of credible justifications for reconfiguring the dis-
trict’s population were not merely coincidental factors, but instead re-
flected an implicit bias against the representational rights of Latino citi-
zens. The Court also would have made clear that these factors, along 
with evidence of historical discrimination against Latinos in Texas, 
caused the State’s politically neutral justification to result in discrimina-
tion in violation of Section 2. Instead, the Court was ambiguous about 
its specific valuation of the state’s actions in light of growing Latino po-
litical power.220 
 Depending on the circumstances, the actor exhibiting implicit bias 
can be: (1) the state—for example, legislators who adopt the chal-
lenged voting practice or the discriminatory measure; (2) citizens—for 
example, voters who engage in racially polarized voting; or (3) quasi-
state actors—for example, political parties that pursue laws and prac-
tices both for their disproportionate impact on minority voters and for 
partisan interests. In each of these cases, implicit, as opposed to ex-
plicit, bias might be the driving force behind the challenged action. 
Moreover, at least three of the Senate factors relevant to vote denial 
claims invite evidence of implicit bias: racially polarized voting (factor 
two), subtle racial appeals (factor six), and the tenuousness of the 
state’s policy (factor B).221 
 Evidence of racially polarized voting does not ascribe intent to ma-
jority-group voters who vote as a bloc to thwart the ability of minority 
voters to elect candidates of their choice.222 Racially polarized voting 
“means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a 
certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where 
different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different 
candidates.”223 Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly determined that 
evidence of racially polarized voting reveals a subtext of racial discrimi-
                                                                                                                      
220 Charles, supra note 215, at 1211; see LULAC, 548 U.S. at 442. 
221 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
222 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 62 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent). 
223 Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implica-
tions for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1385, 1393 (2010) (quoting 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion)); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (majority opin-
ion) (quoting political scientist Bernard Grofman’s definition of racial polarization as “a 
consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes, 
. . . [or when] black voters and white voters vote differently” (first alteration in original)). 
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nation.224 Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed internal conflict 
over the extent to which the cause of racially polarized voting is rele-
vant to the Section 2 inquiry.225 White voters may vote against minority 
voters’ candidate of choice intentionally to discriminate226 because of 
implicit bias against minority candidates or minority voters, or with no 
intent or bias at all.227 The resulting disparate impact on the right to 
                                                                                                                      
224 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (expressly rejecting the district court’s conclusion that to prove ra-
cially polarized voting, “plaintiffs need only demonstrate that whites and blacks generally 
support different candidates to establish legally significant white bloc voting”); Salas v. Sw. 
Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1554 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the inquiry into 
racially polarized voting “aims at determining whether it is racial voting patterns, along 
with other objective factors, rather than some other set of causes, that explain the lack of 
electoral success of voters within the protected class”). Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit requires “an inquiry into the causal relationship between the chal-
lenged practice and the lack of electoral success by the protected class voters.” See Salas, 
964 F.2d at 1554; see also Katz et al., supra note 73, at 670–71 (surveying courts’ applications 
of the three Gingles prerequisites, including racially polarized voting); Randolph M. Scott-
McLaughlin, The Voting Rights Act and the “New and Improved” Intent Test: Old Wine in New 
Bottles, 16 Touro L. Rev. 943, 960–77 (2000) (exploring various judicial interpretations of 
Gingles’s conflicting opinions). 
225 In her concurrence in Gingles, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted that “[e]vidence 
that a candidate preferred by the minority group . . . was rejected by white voters for rea-
sons other than those which made that candidate the preferred choice of the minority 
group would seem clearly relevant in answering the question whether bloc voting by white 
voters will consistently defeat minority candidates.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor argued that this view did not require a 
rejection of the majority approach, however, and instead agreed that factors other than 
race caused the divergence in minority voting patterns. See id. Justice O’Connor further 
noted that: 
Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted 
solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and to assess 
its prospects for electoral success, I agree that defendants cannot rebut this 
showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be 
explained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying divergence 
in the interests of minority and white voters. 
Id. 
226 By recognizing that implicit bias can fuel racially polarized voting, the casual con-
text analysis would not read an intent requirement back into Section 2. See generally Eliza-
beth M. Ryan, Note, Causation or Correlation? The Impact of LULAC v. Clements on Section 2 
Lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 675 (2009) (critiquing the inclusion of a 
causation requirement in racially polarized voting analyses as a direct contravention of the 
1982 VRA amendments). Rather, causal context recognizes that the correlation that ra-
cially polarized voting seeks to establish may represent bias in the electoral process that is 
otherwise undetectable but equally pernicious. 
227 As two scholars have noted, “The implicit cognitive processes might heavily influence 
the final choice of a voter who does not otherwise clearly embrace one candidate over an-
other.” Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias, Election ’08, and the Myth of a Post-
Racial America, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 659, 684 (2010). 
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vote—either in the form of vote denial or vote dilution—should none-
theless be actionable if the surrounding racial context suggests that 
race determines electability in whole or in part. 
 Likewise, evidence of “subtle racial appeals” under Senate factor six 
may result from intentional discrimination or implicit bias that fuels dis-
crimination against minority voters’ candidates of choice.228 The Senate 
Report’s distinction between “overt” and “subtle” racial appeals in the 
Senate factors invites this nuance.229 Similarly, by seeking evidence of 
the “tenuousness” of state policy, Senate factor B not only triggers a 
qualitative analysis of the state’s justifications for purposes of evaluating 
the legitimacy of an election law and its purported goals, but also per-
mits courts to attribute a pretext of discrimination to state action when 
the justifications are insufficient.230 This finding of pretext does not 
necessarily result from explicit bias, but may well be the result of implicit 
bias that the weakness of the state’s justifications reveals. Indeed, tenu-
                                                                                                                      
228 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
177, 206; Katz et al., supra note 73, at 707–17 (summarizing the various types of evidence that 
constitute racial appeals, including ones that could be characterized as implicit bias, such as 
in-group and out-group references, discussion of racially charged issues, photo manipulation, 
and candidate intimidation). 
229 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29. The distinction between overt and subtle appeals is of-
ten blurred. At least two scholars have noted that some explicit racial appeals can never-
theless mask conscious discrimination. See Leland Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the 
“Down Low”: Subtle Racial Appeals in Presidential Campaigns, 24 St. John’s J. Legal Com-
ment. 299, 300 n.4 (2009) (charactering as “subtle racial appeals” those campaign appeals 
that “allow individuals to attribute their attitudes to ostensibly non-racial information and 
to justify their behavior in race-neutral terms”). 
230 See Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1345 n.24 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (stating that 
“[t]he principal probative weight of a tenuous state policy is its propensity to show pre-
text”). But see United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1571 (11th Cir. 
1984) (stating that the Zimmer factor of a nontenuous state policy (Senate factor B) is 
among the least important of the factors for determining vote dilution); Andrew P. Miller 
& Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results 
Test?, 36 Emory L.J. 1, 23 (1987) (noting that, although some courts have continued to 
rely on tenuousness as a relevant factor after the 1982 amendments, others have found 
that it lacks probative value). The conclusion that tenuousness is less relevant to the Sec-
tion 2 results inquiry than to the intent inquiry ignores the probative value of context. By 
demonstrating a lack of justification for the state policy, courts can discern implicit bias in 
the policy’s incoherence. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 
F.2d 728, 753 (5th Cir.) (stating that the tenuousness of state policy was evidence of dis-
criminatory results, but the existence of a legitimate state policy did not preclude a finding 
of vote dilution), rev’d en banc, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); Westwego Citizens for Better 
Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1201–11 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); McMillan v. Es-
cambia Cnty., Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that tenuousness is circum-
stantial evidence of an election system’s discriminatory results); Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 
F.2d at 1571 (same); Houston v. Haley, 663 F. Supp. 346, 355–56 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (same), 
aff’d, 859 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1988), and vacated 869 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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ousness is “relevant insofar as intent is relevant to [the] result: evidence 
that a voting device was intended to discriminate is circumstantial evi-
dence that the device has a discriminatory result. Moreover, the tenu-
ousness of the justification for a state policy may indicate that the policy 
is unfair.”231 Finally, the breadth of Senate factor five’s exploration of 
the interaction of societal discrimination with election laws is another 
potential entry point for implicit bias evidence. Implicit bias can result 
in discrimination outside the electoral arena and interact with race-
neutral election laws to cause discrimination in elections. 
                                                                                                                     
 The common thread among these Senate factors is that they reveal 
discrimination and bias through action and choices that the actor may 
or may not acknowledge or of which the actor may or may not be cog-
nizant. If bias motivates the result, it taints the electoral process regard-
less of the actor’s intent. Notably, implicit bias may be closer to the evi-
dentiary standard that the Court envisioned than to pure, statistically 
based disparate impact. Indeed, the Court’s rejection of evidence of 
statistical disparity as the sole basis of a Section 2 claim and Congress’s 
clear exclusion of an intent requirement under Section 2 leaves the 
door open for implicit bias evidence to provide a direct causal link be-
tween state action and vote denial. 
 The role of implicit bias in election law deserves more extensive 
treatment than can be provided here. For now, it suffices to acknowl-
edge that, conceptually, implicit bias is not new to the Section 2 analysis 
and, most certainly, infects a wide array of election administration prac-
tices that fall within the scope of the VRA.232 Importantly, however, rec-
ognizing the role of evidence of the electoral arena’s implicit bias in 
the Section 2 analysis should not undermine the results standard and 
its concomitant ban on intent. Without care, permitting evidence of 
implicit bias can become a backdoor reentry of the intent standard by 
weaving a search for intent or purpose into the Section 2 analysis. Such 
a result would compromise the core values, legislative history, and plain 
language of Section 2. 
 As these cases and examples indicate, implicit bias evidence, al-
though not a new concept, is still a developing evidentiary standard. 
Nonetheless, the resurgence and expansion of studies on how implicit 
 
231 Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d at 1571 (citation omitted). 
232 For a discussion of implicit bias in elections, see LeRoy, supra note 30, at 1592–95 
(discussing how partisan elections may cause judges to distribute justice based on political 
contributions); Page & Pitts, supra note 30, at 22 (discussing how unconscious bias may 
play a role in the interaction between poll workers and prospective voters, and suggesting 
means of mitigating its impact). 
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bias affects different spheres of law holds promise in voting rights litiga-
tion. As part of the causal context analysis, implicit bias provides an ad-
ditional source of information regarding whether a given election law is 
operating in a climate of inequality and discrimination and transmit-
ting those effects to the electoral arena. Finally, evidence of implicit 
bias fits squarely within the Supreme Court’s constricted reading of the 
VRA in seminal cases such as Shaw v. Reno,233 Miller v. Johnson,234 and 
Shaw v. Hunt.235 Implicit bias provides the missing link between exter-
nal factors and internal impact that has been the source of consterna-
tion for the Court. The causal context analysis of Section 2 is instead a 
more expansive method of linking modern vote denial practices to cur-
rent social and historical climates of discrimination. 
2. The Standard of Proof for External Discrimination 
 Another looming question is whether the evidence of discrimina-
tion external to voting that Senate factor five solicits must demonstrate 
intent, whether statistical disparities can prove it, or whether it is sub-
ject to some other standard. Initially, the Farrakhan IV court deter-
mined that there was compelling evidence of discrimination based on 
evidence of statistical disparities, as well as a qualitative analysis by 
qualified experts who determined that the disparities were not race 
neutral.236 This is neither direct proof of intent nor evidence of statisti-
cal disparities; rather, this proof constituted circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination in Washington State’s criminal justice system and a nar-
rative of inequality.237 Nonetheless, sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
jettisoned the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim on the ground that they did 
not prove that the discrimination in the state’s criminal justice system 
was intentional.238 
 To require evidence of intentional discrimination with respect to 
any of the Senate factors is problematic for several reasons. First, it 
would require Section 2 plaintiffs to prove a case of intentional dis-
crimination within a Section 2 case in order to sustain a claim. Not only 
is this approach inconsistent with Section 2’s application to date, but it 
imposes a burden on plaintiffs that Section 2 does not require, and, 
                                                                                                                      
233 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
234 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995). 
235 517 U.S. 899, 912 (1996). 
236 Farrakhan IV, 590 F.3d at 997. 
237 Id. at 1004. 
238 Farrakhan V, 623 F.3d at 993 (affirming that felon disenfranchisement laws may be 
challenged under Section 2 of the VRA). 
2013] The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 627 
indeed, runs directly counter to Section 2.239 Importantly, the concern 
regarding the level of proof of discrimination required is not based 
solely on the notion that a stringent proof standard would reintroduce 
an intent standard into Section 2. Indeed, contrary to the assertion of 
many Section 2 supporters, requiring that intent be proved is not a 
backdoor reinsertion of an intent standard because requiring that in-
tent be proved external to voting is not the same as requiring that it is 
proved with respect to voting. Instead, the problem with requiring proof 
of intent in the discrimination external to voting is that it fundamen-
tally misses the point of Section 2 (and indeed the VRA as a whole), 
which is to recognize that electoral practices do not operate in a vac-
uum. Rather, they interact with social conditions, including state poli-
cies and practices infused with bias, and at times, even intentional dis-
crimination, to compromise the integrity of the electoral process as a 
neutral, “race-free zone” or a sphere of society that race minimally im-
pacts. This approach is consistent with the standard of proof applied to 
date to Senate factor five and to other Senate factors.240 
 It is easy to conflate the Farrakhan IV holding that statistical dispari-
ties in voting are insufficient by themselves to prove a Section 2 violation 
with the notion that statistical disparities are insufficient to establish 
proof of Senate factor five. That conflation distorts the purpose of the 
Section 2 inquiry and contradicts the Court’s historical treatment of dis-
crimination external to voting.241 For example, the Supreme Court has 
held that Congress has the authority to prohibit literacy tests because 
such tests import discrimination from the education system into the po-
litical process.242 Similarly, in considering other Senate factors, such as 
the use of racial appeals in elections (Senate factor six) or inadequate 
responsiveness on the part of government officials (Senate factor A), 
                                                                                                                      
239 See Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit’s Heightened Sec-
tion 2 “Intentional Discrimination” Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 111 Colum. L. Rev. Side-
bar 51, 57 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/51_ 
Haygood.pdf (critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in which it held that plaintiffs 
must prove that the state’s criminal justice system was “infected by intentional discrimina-
tion”(quoting Farrakhan V, 623 F.3d at 993)). 
240 See Farrakhan IV, 590 F.3d at 1005. 
241 See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 722 (arguing that to require proof of intentional dis-
crimination “makes little sense . . . if the results test is supposed to serve as a prophylactic 
against voting practices . . . adopted or retained due to intentional discrimination that 
would be difficult to prove in court,” and that “[s]uch intent may exist whether or not 
there has been intentional discrimination external to the voting process.”). 
242 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117, 133 (1970) (unanimous decision) (holding 
that Congress has the power to ban literacy tests based in part on the record of “substantial 
if not overwhelming” racial discrimination in education). 
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Section 2 does not require that these factors be proved according to the 
legal standard befitting an independent legal claim on that basis. Like-
wise, with respect to Senate factor five, it is not necessary to offer proof 
of external discrimination that would satisfy an independent claim suffi-
cient to sustain a remedy for that discrimination itself. 
 Because plaintiffs are not seeking relief for the external discrimi-
nation itself, they should not be required to prove the existence of that 
external discrimination in the same way that they would if they were 
directly seeking relief for the discrimination. Instead, Section 2’s causal 
context analysis permits plaintiffs to prove discrimination sufficient to 
dispose of the argument that the disparate impact of the electoral prac-
tice is entirely race neutral.243 To the extent that racial disparities exist 
and are inexplicable in race-neutral terms, the direct cause of those 
disparities should be found unlawful, or at least, as in the case of the 
remedy provided for by the VRA, suspended until the disparity is cured 
or race-neutral justifications prevail.244 
 The extensive evidence of unconscious bias in society and its re-
sulting disparate impact on the electoral process challenge the Su-
preme Court’s now-entrenched rejection of disparate impact proof as 
independently sufficient to prove a claim.245 The traditional under-
standing of disparate impact before such proof became relevant was 
that disparate impact is the result of natural forces—that the external-
ities were too varied and far-reaching to discern any measurable animus 
that might justify a remedy based on race.246 Implicit bias research 
turns this presumption on its head, giving even the most ardent “intent-
based” defenders something to hang their hats on.247 Indeed, racial 
animus is racial animus, even if it is unintended or unconscious. 
3. Tenuousness of the State Policy 
 In addition to evidence of external discrimination, evidence of 
tenuousness contributes to the totality of the circumstances inquiry by 
                                                                                                                      
243 This approach might be called “process of elimination” discrimination, whereby one 
rules out all legitimate bases for existing racial disparities and is left with racial bias—
unconscious or conscious—as the only likely explanation. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, The Discrimi-
nating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 979, 986 (2008) (“Because people rarely ad-
mit to taking race into account, conscious discrimination is often covert or hidden from view. 
Proving discrimination therefore comes down to a process of elimination. The key is to rule 
out other explanations.”). 
244 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2006). 
245 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
246 See Foster, supra note 7, at 1472. 
247 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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either eliminating or establishing pretext surrounding the challenged 
practice.248 Whether the justifications for a challenged electoral practice 
are tenuous helps to establish pretext for and supports an inference of 
discrimination—including unintentional discrimination—sufficient to 
establish that the disparate impact has occurred on account of race. The 
Senate Report’s framing of the evaluation of the state’s justification sup-
ports this construction of Section 2.249 By employing the term “tenu-
ousness,” which by definition refers to “flims[iness],” “weak[ness],” or 
“having little substance,”250 the Senate directed courts’ analysis toward 
determining whether the policy underlying the challenged practice is 
suspect. In so doing, the Senate indicated an interest in revealing pre-
text and bias, rather than determining the legitimacy of the practice for 
its own sake. A policy that is tenuous is thus treated as suspect within the 
totality of the circumstances analysis under Section 2. 
 Interpreting the tenuousness factor too broadly inevitably skews 
the analysis of the challenged practice. A rational and legitimate policy 
supporting a state action, in contrast to an action that is arbitrary and 
irrational, may be presumed to be free of bias. Section 2, however, does 
not compel that inquiry. Instead, courts are asked to evaluate whether 
there is evidence of tenuousness, not whether there is evidence of le-
gitimacy. The state’s legitimate interest in maintaining a challenged 
policy cannot override a racially disparate impact, as evidenced by the 
existence or extent of one or more Senate factors.251 Indeed, the pur-
pose of Section 2 is to root out racial discrimination—by intent or ef-
fect—in the electoral process; it is not to permit such discrimination so 
long as the state has a good non-racial reason for the policy.252 
                                                                                                                      
 
248 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. 
249 Id. (“[W]hether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such 
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.”). 
250 Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (9th ed. 1991). 
251 One way to improve the inverse relation test—and to ensure against this result—
would be to require that tenuousness bear an inverse relationship not only to disparate 
impact, but also to the evidence of external discrimination. See supra note 183 and accom-
panying text. Expanding the inverse relation test to include external discrimination brings 
us closer to the robust totality of the circumstances test that Section 2 requires, and isolates 
the factors that are likely to be most relevant in a disparate vote denial case. Nevertheless, 
the danger in isolating and weighting any single factor or subset of factors in the totality of 
the circumstances remains. 
252 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) (stating that a violation of Section 2 exists if “it is shown 
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivi-
sion are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by sub-
section (a)”). This raises a fundamental proof question: can absence of a Senate factor be a 
defense? Because the Senate factors are a non-exhaustive list of relevant considerations and 
the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that no one factor makes or breaks a claim, permit-
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 Moreover, to the extent that the state burdens the right to vote be-
yond what is necessary to achieve the race-neutral policy goal, the pol-
icy is tenuous.253 This interpretation of the tenuousness factor is consis-
tent with the framing of the other Senate factors. Each of the factors 
directs courts to determine the role of race in a challenged practice 
based on direct or circumstantial evidence.254 For example, the factors 
examining “[t]he extent of any history of official discrimination,”255 
“[t]he extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized,”256 “[t]he extent to which the state or 
political subdivision has used unusually large election districts . . . that 
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority 
group,”257 and “[w]hether political campaigns have been characterized 
by overt or subtle racial appeals”258 (factors one, two, three, and six, 
respectively) permit the court to infer that a disparate impact occurred 
on account of race based on the existence and extent of one or more 
factors. The casual context test would also permit plaintiffs to establish 
tenuousness by examining whether government actors have minimized 
the racial impact of an electoral practice. 
 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) 
administrative guidance for age discrimination claims is instructive on 
this point.259 In response to the Supreme Court’s shifting standard from 
                                                                                                                      
 
ting the absence of Senate factors to establish a defense would undermine the totality of the 
circumstances principle. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45. Instead, courts are to weigh the presence, 
absence, strength, and weakness of individual factors in the totality of the circumstances 
analysis to determine whether the disparate impact that the challenged practice causes is on 
account of race. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
253 See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing 
Disparities, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 19, 19 (2007) (arguing that requiring racial impact state-
ments prior to enacting law enforcement regulations “would enable legislators and the public 
to anticipate any unwarranted racial disparities and to consider alternative policies that could 
accomplish the goals of the legislation without causing undue racial effects”). 
254 S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269. 
255 Id. at 29. 
256 Id. 
257 Id (emphasis added). 
258 Id. 
259 EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. Recent election law scholarship has ac-
knowledged the potentially transformative role of administrative law and agencies in the 
future enforcement of voting rights and election administration. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 
160, at 17, 26. The EEOC’s role in preserving and defining a relevant space for disparate 
impact claims in the employment context is a worthy example of how institutions and agen-
cies can balance and even temper the judicial response to such claims. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607.4(D) (2012) (EEOC Title VII regulation) (defining criteria for a showing of disparate 
impact). For example, the EEOC has issued guidance on what determines whether an em-
ployment practice is based on RFOA—the lesser standard that supplanted business necessity. 
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business necessity to the less potent “reasonable factors other than age” 
(RFOA) standard in age discrimination suits,260 the EEOC offered the 
following guidance concerning the evidentiary support for such claims: 
If a police department decided to require applicants for patrol 
positions to pass a physical fitness test to be sure that the offi-
cers were physically able to pursue and apprehend suspects, it 
should know that such a test might exclude older workers 
more than younger ones. Nevertheless, the department’s ac-
tions would likely be based on an RFOA if it reasonably be-
lieved that the test measured the speed and strength appropri-
ate to the job, and if it did not know, or should not have 
known, of steps that it could have taken to reduce harm to 
older workers without unduly burdening the department.261 
These guidelines can be distilled into what I term the “ARC” analysis: 
(1) awareness of the law’s impact; (2) reasonable belief in its necessity; 
and (3) cognizable harm reduction and balancing. The EEOC guide-
lines further instruct that “[t]he rule emphasizes the need for an indi-
vidualized consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the particular situation.”262 
                                                                                                                      
See EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. The factors are instructive to the VRA analysis: 
“An employment practice is based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and admin-
istered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the circumstances, including its 
potential harm to older workers.” Id. The electoral arena, however, has yet to have the benefit 
of an administrative agency with the authority, consistency, and relevance of the EEOC. 
260 See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005). 
261 EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. 
262 Id. Considerations relevant to assessing reasonableness include the following: 
(i) The extent to which the factor is related to the employer’s stated busi-
ness purpose; 
(ii) The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and 
applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which 
managers and supervisors were given guidance or training about how 
to apply the factor and avoid discrimination; 
(iii) The extent to which the employer limited supervisors’ discretion to as-
sess employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the su-
pervisors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative 
age-based stereotypes; 
(iv) The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its 
employment practice on older workers; and 
(v) The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, 
in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons ad-
versely affected, and the extent to which the employer took steps to 
reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps. 
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
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 Repurposed for vote denial claims, the EEOC’s RFOA standard 
can be transformed to reasonable factors other than race (“RFOR”). In 
particular, RFOR could be used to determine the tenuousness of the 
state policy (Senate factor five), or, in other words, the reasonableness 
of the state’s belief in the need for the electoral law or practice. Accord-
ingly, RFOR for vote denial claims would evaluate: 
• The extent to which the factor—for example, voter ID, felon 
status, or consistent registration data—is related to the state’s 
stated election administration purpose; 
• The extent to which the state defined the factor accurately and 
applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to 
which election officials and other state actors were given guidance 
or training about how to apply the factor and avoid discrimination; 
• The extent to which the state limited election officials’ discretion 
to assess voters subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the 
state actors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to nega-
tive race-based stereotypes; 
• The extent to which the state assessed the adverse impact of its 
election law on racial minorities; and 
• The degree of the harm to individuals within the minority group, 
in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons 
adversely affected, and the extent to which the state took steps to 
reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such 
steps.263 
These factors would incentivize states to take specific actions to avoid 
potential liability. First, the state must become aware of the law’s im-
pact. It would no longer be sufficient to enact a law affecting elections 
without assessing the impact of the potential vote abridgement it may 
cause. Second, there must be a substantial threat to the integrity of 
elections to make the state’s belief in the necessity of the electoral law 
reasonable. The bulleted factors above help guide an analysis of rea-
sonableness. Third, there must be an identifiable harm of which the 
state was not, and should not have been, aware, that could be addressed 
without burdening the right to vote to such an extent. 
 Unlike the prerequisites and burden-shifting test, however, the 
plaintiff would bear the affirmative burden of establishing tenuousness 
by using the ARC principles or other proof. In applying the ARC prin-
                                                                                                                      
263 See EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. These RFOR factors are adapted from 
the EEOC’s guidelines regarding RFOA. 
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ciples, the causal context test permits a discomfiting recounting of the 
effects of systemic and vestigial racism on the quotidian existence of 
racial minorities and their electoral participation. Indeed, this is the 
causal context at its core. The overarching narrative traces the impact 
of racial inequality within and outside of the electoral arena on the 
electoral participation of minorities. Section 2 jurisprudence, the VRA’s 
congressional record, and the plain text of Section 2 provide helpful 
guideposts toward the key elements of a successful narrative. Thus, 
framed in the narrative of causal context, Section 2’s totality of the cir-
cumstances test is flexible enough to account for historical context and 
adapt to shifting conceptions of racial discrimination while fending off 
constitutional attack. 
III. Applying the Causal Context Test to Modern Vote Denial 
 A workable disparate vote denial test requires certain fixed and 
definable elements. First, there must be vote denial or other infringe-
ment on the right to vote. In the case of voter ID, restrictive voting pe-
riods, felon disfranchisement, and other practices resulting in modern 
vote denial, this threshold requirement is easy to satisfy by direct refer-
ence to the challenged statute that denies or burdens the right to vote 
based on a particular act or classification—for example, failure to pro-
duce valid identification, felon status, or, in the case of voter purges, 
incorrect or inconsistent registration information.264 In voter ID cases, 
this threshold could be met with proof that certain voters are unable to 
meet or are disproportionately burdened by the voter ID requirements, 
and are, therefore, more likely to be unable to cast a ballot on Election 
Day. Second, plaintiffs must prove that the denial or burden is on ac-
count of race. Indeed, the disparate impact itself offers some potential 
proof of a race-based voting burden.265 When coupled with evidence of 
how the race-neutral law interacts with external social conditions, the 
tenuousness of the policy (including the ARC principles), and the sur-
rounding electoral context, the disparate impact will become either 
more or less explicable in terms of race.266 
 In lieu of burden shifting, plaintiffs bear responsibility for the af-
firmative case in its entirety.267 Plaintiffs may utilize all Senate factors at 
                                                                                                                      
 
264 See supra notes 103–125 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra notes 248–263 and accompanying text. 
267 To be sure, the prerequisites and burden-shifting test predates the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s 2010 decision in Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan IV ), which bear upon what a legally 
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their disposal to place the disparate impact in a broader context—the 
causal context.268 At bottom, it is enough to use circumstantial evidence 
to eliminate race-neutral causes for disparate vote denial from the 
range of possible explanations. Here, “race neutral” should be under-
stood in its most literal sense: if a law is neutral as to race, then the race 
of the voter should not be predictive of the likelihood that he or she 
will experience vote denial. This is not a back-end means of proving a 
Section 2 claim solely by statistical disparities; rather, it forces the trier 
of fact to consider the vote denial claim in the absence of proof of in-
tent as the 1982 VRA amendments require.269 The fact that race plays a 
determining role in who gets to vote and who does not is sufficient to 
satisfy Section 2. This vigilance in preventing the insertion of race into 
the electoral sphere is consistent with the intent and purpose of the 
VRA.270 
 No matter the formulation of the test, however, the crucial ques-
tion of its constitutionality remains. The constitutionality of the VRA 
has been the subject of a steady stream of legal challenges since its in-
ception and has been successfully affirmed each time.271 Indeed, as is 
often cited in its defense, the VRA is an exemplar of congressional 
power at its zenith.272 Nevertheless, the scope of Congress’s authority is 
                                                                                                                      
viable test for new vote denial claims—especially felon disfranchisement claims—would be. 
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009); Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan IV ), 590 
F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir.), aff’d in part, overruled in part en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Farrakhan V ); supra notes 185–196 and accompanying text (explaining the “prerequisites 
and burden-shifting” test). 
268 This approach is also consistent with vote dilution claims. Indeed, even the prereq-
uisites established by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles do not create a burden-
shifting mechanism, and leave the onus on plaintiffs to affirmatively prove disparate im-
pact. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986). 
269 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
270 See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text. 
271 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
has upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA twice since it was reauthorized in 
2006. See LaRoque v. Holder, 831 F. Supp. 2d 183, 238 (D.D.C. 2011); Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. 
Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 508 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding Section 5’s “preclearance” 
provision in a challenge by the city of Calera, Alabama, which enacted a discriminatory 
redistricting plan without seeking preclearance, resulting in a loss by the city’s only African 
American councilman), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). 
272 See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 309 (noting that the unique historical period of the 
VRA’s enactment justifies the Act’s expansive powers); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and 
Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L.J. 174, 177 (2007) (explaining that Congress 
“acted at the apex of its power to enforce the guarantees of the post-Civil War Amend-
ments” when it enacted the VRA). 
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under scrutiny in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in 
City of Boerne v. Flores273 and other cases. Moreover, a different Court in 
a different socio-historical moment is vetting current challenges to the 
VRA’s constitutionality.274 Accordingly, the Court’s continued recogni-
tion of the VRA’s constitutionality is hardly a foregone conclusion.275 
 The arguments supporting and challenging the VRA’s constitu-
tionality have been thoughtfully laid out in an array of scholarship and 
are not repeated here.276 Instead, I focus on certain factors unique to 
                                                                                                                      
273 See 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that remedial legislation can prohibit con-
duct that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but “[t]here must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end”); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding 
that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is valid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–39 (2003) (holding that 
Congress acted within its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating the 
states’ immunity under the Family and Medical Leave Act). To the extent that the VRA is 
primarily Fifteenth Amendment remedial legislation, City of Boerne’s congruence and pro-
portionality test does not apply. 
274 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Is This the Beginning of the End of the Second Reconstruction?, 
Fed. Law., June 2012, at 54, 58 (“The country’s constitutional culture is clearly different to-
day than it was at the time the Court decided [Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 631 (1966)]. 
The Court is far more assertive and muscular than it used to be, and the political question 
doctrine seems to be largely a relic of our constitutional past.”). 
275 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that 
Congress did not exceed its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in authorizing the 
preclearance requirement of the VRA), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) 
(No. 12-96); Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cv-128, 2012 WL 3743676, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 
2012) (considering the plaintiff’s argument that Section 5 of the VRA “exceeds the enu-
merated powers of Congress and conflicts with Article IV of the Constitution and the 
Tenth Amendment”); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204–
05 (2009) (upholding Section 5 under a congruence and proportionality standard). 
276 See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 223, at 1388; Warren M. Christopher, The 
Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1965); Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 697, 
701 (2009); Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the Extent of the 
VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 Hastings L.J. 923, 927 (2011); Richard 
L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After 
Tennessee v. Lane, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 177, 178–81 (2005); Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 
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Section 2 and the causal context test that insulate it from constitutional 
challenge. In particular, Section 2 brings external discrimination into 
the remedial ambit of election law.277 In turn, this produces outcomes 
that are seemingly incongruent as a normative matter—the identifica-
tion of racial harm without a legal remedy for that harm—and yet per-
fectly congruent as a legal one. This juxtaposition illuminates a sensible 
limit of the VRA’s remedial power and Section 2’s constitutional prow-
ess. Indeed, the limits imposed on remedies available under Section 2 
underscore its genius. 
 Section 2 remedies do not necessarily impose a permanent ban on 
the challenged electoral practice.278 Instead, Section 2 discontinues the 
use of an otherwise lawful electoral practice so long as it continues to 
result in vote denial or dilution on account of race. If the causal con-
text of race discrimination is eliminated, then the practice, presumably, 
would be valid. In the context of felon disfranchisement laws, for ex-
ample, if rates of conviction begin to approximate rates of criminal ac-
tivity across all racial groups, then felon disfranchisement provisions 
would not be challengeable under Section 2—absent evidence of inten-
tional discrimination—even if a disparate impact on voting rights oc-
curred. Under established Section 2 jurisprudence, if in fact blacks 
commit crimes at a higher rate than whites, and are therefore convicted 
of crimes at a correspondingly higher rate, resulting in a loss of voting 
rights at a correspondingly higher rate, then the practice would pre-
sumptively be valid under Section 2 despite its disparate impact. Con-
sequently, no Section 2 claim could be established. 
 There is indeed a peculiarity in challenging the symptom of dis-
criminatory vote denial resulting from the problem of racial discrimina-
tion in society, while leaving the problem ostensibly unremediated. This 
outcome is a function of the surgical nature of the VRA’s remedies, 
which consequently preserves the VRA’s constitutionality. For example, 
in the case of felon disfranchisement, discrimination in the criminal 
justice system that is not legally cognizable under the Supreme Court’s 
1987 decision in McCleskey v. Kemp can nonetheless form the basis of a 
                                                                                                                      
Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 
1195, 1202 (2012). 
277 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. 
278 Although Section 2 itself is a “permanent” provision of the VRA, a Section 2 viola-
tion is unlike a violation of the VRA’s other provisions in that it may be cured by the pas-
sage of time. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa, 1973b(b) (2006) (implementing a permanent, na-
tionwide ban on literacy tests). 
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disparate impact claim under the causal context analysis.279 This seem-
ingly incongruent result is consistent with the VRA’s mandate to pre-
vent racial discrimination—either purposeful or by effect—from com-
promising the integrity of our democracy. Section 2’s constitutionality is 
preserved because discrimination external to the electoral process that 
informs a disparate vote denial claim is not actionable under the VRA. 
That is, the VRA’s narrow but penetrating purpose of protecting elec-
tions from the effects of external discrimination and not prosecuting 
that discrimination directly distances the VRA from the constitutional 
concerns that surround other disparate impact claims.280 
 The presumption of discrimination that Section 2 establishes satis-
fies congruence and proportionality for several reasons. The remedy 
sought in Section 2 vote denial challenges is in effect only temporary. 
Conditions external to the process of voting that presumably can be 
corrected provide the rationale for the remedy, and the remedy is no 
longer appropriate once those conditions cease to create a disparate 
impact. The remedy is not a referendum on the policy and practice of 
voter ID, early voting, felon disfranchisement, voter purges, or similar 
modern vote denial practices; rather, it is a referendum on the racially 
disparate results that these laws produce in the electoral arena and the 
consequent effect on democracy. Because of the power of the vote in 
our democracy—because the right to vote secures all others281— Con-
gress has determined that discrimination may not infect voting or limit 
it on account of race, even if such discrimination is not purposeful. 
 As a practical matter, how can the causal context test be used to 
combat modern vote denial practices that threaten to roll back the his-
toric minority voter registration of the 2008 and 2012 elections, as well 
as the history of progress and transformation that is the VRA’s ongoing 
legacy? In the following Sections, I take three persistent threats to ro-
bust minority voter participation—voter ID, felon disfranchisement, 
and voter purges—and outline briefly how the causal context test 
would apply to each. 
                                                                                                                      
279 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987); supra notes 126–135 and accom-
panying text. 
280 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of 
a Conservative Court, 5 Duke J. Const. L. & Pol’y 125, 142 (2010) (arguing that the politi-
cal ideologies of Supreme Court justices, and, more importantly, their proclivity toward 
policy making, are likely to play a consequential role in determining the VRA’s constitu-
tionality). 
281 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (noting that “the political fran-
chise of voting” is a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”). 
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A. Voter ID 
 Since 2008, state governments across the country have enacted a 
plethora of laws that encumber the right to vote. Of the array of voting 
barriers, including decreased opportunities for early voting,282 re-
trenchment from reforms aimed at enfranchising citizens with felony 
convictions,283 and more stringent voter registration regulations,284 
voter ID laws stand out as among the most suspicious. Like most of these 
new voting restrictions, voter ID laws disproportionately burden the vot-
ing rights of young, minority, and low-income voters, as well as persons 
with disabilities.285 Nationally, twenty-five percent of black voting-age 
citizens, as compared to only nine percent of white voting-age citizens, 
lack a government-issued photo identification.286 Although many causes 
factor into this disparity, a disproportionate lack of a driver’s license, 
high residential mobility, and lack of access to necessary documentation 
play significant roles.287 
                                                                                                                     
 As discussed above, many recent challenges to voter ID laws have 
been brought under Section 5 of the VRA.288 This is due to the Su-
preme Court’s 2008 holding in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 
that a legitimate state interest in preventing voter fraud, modernizing 
elections, and safeguarding voter confidence outweighs the burden 
placed on voters to produce voter IDs to exercise their right to vote.289 
 
 
282 See Weiser & Norden, supra note 2, at 29–33 (reporting that nine states have intro-
duced bills to reduce their early voting periods, and that Florida, Georgia, and Ohio have 
cut their early voting periods in half). 
283 See id. at 34–36; see also NAACP, Defending Democracy, supra note 111, at 26 (ex-
plaining that there are now four states that permanently deprive individuals of the right to 
vote after they have been convicted of a felony); id. at 12, 25–27 (explaining that these 
restrictions will have a disproportionate burden on minorities because African Americans 
and Latinos suffer disproportionate rates of criminal conviction). 
284 See Rogowski & Cohen, supra note 2, at 2–3; Weiser & Norden, supra note 2, at 
19–28. 
285 At least one report estimated that these new laws “could make it significantly harder 
for more than five million eligible voters to cast ballots in 2012.” Weiser & Norden, supra 
note 2, at 1 (analyzing nineteen laws and two executive actions that passed in fourteen 
states). 
286 See Rogowski & Cohen, supra note 2, at 4. 
287 Id. at 2. 
288 See supra notes 103–125 and accompanying text. 
289 See 553 U.S. 181, 191–200 (2008). Justice John Paul Stevens provided the following 
reasoning in his opinion for the 6–3 majority: 
[T]he photo identification cards issued by Indiana’s BMV are . . . free. For 
most voters who need them, the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV, 
gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does 
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The causal context test allows Section 2 to potentially address voter ID 
laws by permitting plaintiffs to prove that there is a broader context of 
inequality that creates the disparity in possession of certain forms of 
voter ID. For example, implicit bias surrounding voter ID laws might be 
inferred from the demographics of the states that have sought to im-
pose such laws, the likely effect that those laws will have on minority 
communities in those states, and the impact that such laws will have on 
the ability of minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice.290 
Moreover, the lack of evidence of voter fraud to justify the imposition of 
the laws in light of the disparate impact that results could prove Senate 
factor five, the tenuousness of the state policy.291 The ARC principles 
would call into question the state’s awareness of the impact of the voter 
ID laws (1) whether there is a reasonable belief that the laws are neces-
sary to achieve a legitimate election administration goal, and (2) 
whether there is another way of achieving the state’s goal that would 
reduce the potential harm to minority voters.292 Enforcing these prin-
ciples would significantly retard the proliferating efforts to impose 
voter ID laws absent any state justification based on evidence of fraud. 
                                                                                                                      
not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a 
significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. 
 Both evidence in the record and facts of which we may take judicial notice, 
however, indicate that a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited 
number of persons. They include elderly persons born out of state, who may 
have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate[, etc.] . . . . 
 The severity of that burden is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligi-
ble, voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will 
ultimately be counted. To do so, however, they must travel to the circuit court 
clerk’s office within 10 days to execute the required affidavit. It is unlikely 
that such a requirement would pose a constitutional problem unless it is 
wholly unjustified. And even assuming that the burden may not be justified as 
to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petition-
ers’ right to the relief they seek in this litigation. 
Id. at 198–200 (footnotes omitted). Notably, in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs were successful in 
bringing a non-VRA challenge that resulted in a court postponing the implementation of 
voter ID laws until after the upcoming general election. Applewhite v. Pennsylvania, No. 
330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012). 
290 See, e.g., Sonne v. Bd. of Trs. of Suffern, 887 N.Y.S.2d 145, 155 (App. Div. 2009) 
(recognizing the plaintiff’s argument for disparate treatment because the village building 
code was selectively enforced in violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights). 
291 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. 
292 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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B. Felon Disfranchisement 
 The underlying theory premising felon disfranchisement chal-
lenges under Section 2 is that the effects of discrimination in the 
criminal justice system are replicated in the electoral process because of 
laws that deny or abridge the right of persons convicted of a felony to 
vote.293 These challenges sharply demonstrate how the Senate factors 
can be used to reveal racial discrimination in various contexts external 
to elections, such as the criminal justice system, in order to sustain a 
remedy under the VRA. The expanding number of such challenges in 
the past decade is a testament to the broad impact of felon disfran-
chisement laws on communities of color throughout the United States. 
 Putting aside the question of whether Section 2 can reach felon 
disfranchisement laws,294 felon disfranchisement cases raise difficult 
                                                                                                                      
 
293 Most courts entertaining challenges to felon disfranchisement laws have been hos-
tile to such claims. Namely, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that the VRA does not apply to felon disfranchisement laws. See, e.g., 
Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the VRA does not apply to 
Massachusetts’s felon disfranchisement laws); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 329 (2d Cir. 
2006) (en banc) (holding that the VRA does not apply to New York’s felon disfranchise-
ment laws); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the VRA does not apply to Florida’s felon disfranchisement laws). Another group of 
federal appellate courts have assumed, without holding, that the VRA applies, but have 
held that there was no sufficient nexus between the challenged vote denial and the alleged 
racial effects. See Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 
2000) (assuming without deciding that the VRA applies to Virginia’s laws, but holding that 
there was no Section 2 violation); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(assuming without deciding that the VRA applies to Tennessee’s laws, but holding that 
there was no Section 2 violation). The one federal appellate court that initially determined 
that there was a Section 2 violation later reversed itself en banc. See Farrakhan V, 623 F.3d at 
993–94 (reversing a panel opinion that held that the discrimination in Washington’s 
criminal justice system so infected the electoral process through its otherwise legitimate 
felon disfranchisement laws that those laws violated the VRA). 
294 For reasons deserving more attention than is devoted here, I believe that felon dis-
franchisement statutes fall squarely within the ambit of Section 2. To suggest otherwise 
would mean that an intentionally racially discriminatory statute denying persons convicted 
of felonies the right to vote could not be brought under Section 2. See Farrakhan v. Wash-
ington (Farrakhan III ), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121–24 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Intentional discrimination in the criminal justice 
system, if it interacts with a standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting, could 
amount to illegal vote denial on account of race.”) (citing Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc, 337 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004)). The absurdity 
of this result makes finding that Section 2 applies equally to felon disfranchisement stat-
utes that are not intended to discriminate on account of race but, nonetheless, have the 
effect of doing so more comprehensible as a textual matter. In addition, these laws may be 
constitutionally vulnerable on other grounds. See generally Nelson, supra note 170 (examin-
ing the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement with respect to the First Amendment 
and the Equal Protection Clause); David Zetlin-Jones, Note, Right to Remain Silent?: What the 
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questions regarding how to prove discrimination through evidence of 
disparate impact as a touchstone rather than as the sole evidentiary 
support. A separate but related implication of felon disfranchisement 
challenges is that they are an indirect “adjudication” of racial discrimi-
nation within the criminal justice system and in other non-electoral 
contexts. In other words, the Senate factors allow for a showing of dis-
crimination that may or may not give rise to an independent cause of 
action to remedy that discrimination. Like voter ID challenges, felon 
disfranchisement cases require courts to determine that there is socie-
tal discrimination in the criminal justice system, and provide a remedy 
that has no direct relation to correcting that discrimination. 
 In the 2010 case, Farrakhan IV, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit utilized a test much like the causal context test outlined 
here.295 In later denying the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim, the en banc 
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to proffer evidence of a “causal 
connection” between the compelling evidence of discrimination in 
Washington’s criminal justice system and the racially disparate vote de-
nial that the state’s felon disfranchisement statutes effect.296 For exam-
ple, in addition to proof of substantial disparate impact, the plaintiffs 
proffered uncontroverted evidence of statistical disparities at every 
stage of the criminal justice system, as well as a qualitative assessment of 
the data by sociology and law enforcement experts, who opined that 
the outcomes of the criminal justice system resulted from practices that 
could not be explained in race-neutral terms.297 Put another way, the 
experts testified that the statistical disparities were produced on ac-
count of race.298 Controlling for rates of criminal activity, blacks are 
convicted of crimes at rates disproportionately higher than whites.299 
Assuming that the goal of law enforcement is to identify and prosecute 
perpetrators of illegal activity, the racial demographics of those prose-
cuted should approximate those of the perpetrators absent some valid, 
race-neutral explanation for the disparity. Here, the uncontroverted 
evidence showed that racial groups are not represented among the 
population of convicted felons in rates that reflect their criminal activ-
                                                                                                                      
Voting Rights Act Can and Should Say About Felony Disenfranchisement, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 411 
(2006) (assessing the shortcomings of challenges to felony disenfranchisement statutes 
under the VRA and proposing constitutional alternatives). 
295See 590 F.3d at 1005. 
296 Farrakhan V, 623 F.3d at 993–94. 
297 Farrakhan IV, 590 F.3d at 1012–13. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
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ity.300 That is the statistical disparity. The evidence also showed, how-
ever, that apparent race-neutral explanations for the disparity were not 
credible.301 This significant disparity, coupled with the absence of a 
race-neutral policy that explains the disparity, supports a conclusion of 
discrimination in the criminal justice system.302 
 The plaintiffs in Farrakhan IV offered uncontroverted proof of the 
disparate impact of Washington’s felon disfranchisement laws on mi-
nority voters and of racial disparities at every point of contact with the 
state’s criminal justice system.303 The majority acknowledged this evi-
dence of disparate impact without ascribing a specific value to it or 
categorizing it as a prerequisite factor in a balancing test.304 Rather, the 
panel majority set out to discern whether the disparate impact was cre-
ated in part because of discrimination external to voting, and held that, 
indeed, it was.305 Specifically, the court relied on expert analyses of the 
disparity to conclude that the disparity could not be explained in race-
neutral terms.306 
 Despite the controversial policy rationales underlying felon dis-
franchisement laws and the challenges to them, these statutes provide a 
useful lens through which to examine the full reach and application of 
Section 2 of the VRA in vote denial claims. The presumed constitution-
ality of the practice of felon disfranchisement307 should not thwart the 
opportunity to better understand congressional power, the largesse of 
the VRA as an antidiscrimination tool, and the state of disparate impact 
jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                                      
300 Id. 
301 Id. 
302 See id. In Wesley v. Collins, 
[t]he court of appeals did not specifically affirm, or even mention, the trial 
court’s holding that “while intent need not be shown [under Section 2], the 
ultimate conclusion that a violation has occurred must be tied to a finding 
that the scheme unfairly impacts on the minority group—not necessarily 
purposefully, but at least for reasons deemed more culpable than neutral.” 
Pershing, supra note 180, at 1191 (emphasis added) (quoting Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 
802, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986)). 
303 Farrakhan IV, 590 F.3d at 1012–13. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 1014. 
306 Id. 
307 See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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C. Voter Purges 
 In the months leading up to the 2012 general election, some states 
purged their rolls of registered voters in ways that alarmed interest 
groups and triggered allegations of voter suppression.308 Florida, whose 
voter purge preceding the 2000 elections became the subject of post-
election lawsuits,309 pursued a controversial voter purge that the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and many civil rights groups opposed in 
advance of the 2012 general elections. Like many recent claims of voter 
fraud, those that the State of Florida articulated were de minimis in 
number—particularly so when compared to the number of false purges 
and the amount of proven fraud among Florida’s eleven million-plus 
registered voters.310 Florida justified the purges as based on an alleged 
need to remove noncitizens from its voter registration rolls to ensure 
the integrity of its absentee ballot process.311 Of the ninety-five cases 
brought by the DOJ’s Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative be-
tween October 2002 and September 2005, however, “none of the 
crimes prosecuted in this period could possibly have been prevented by 
requiring photo identification at the polls.”312 Under the causal context 
analysis, the unfounded perception of certain Florida elected officials 
that the voting rolls contained a significant number of noncitizens 
could be evidence of implicit (or even explicit) bias. As with voter ID 
challenges, plaintiffs challenging similar purges under the causal con-
text analysis would be able to proffer evidence of disparate impact and 
evidence supporting the Senate factors, including evidence of the 
tenuousness of the State’s policy. For example, the ARC analysis allows 
plaintiffs to show that the disparate impact is caused by reasonable fac-
tors other than race. 
                                                                                                                      
308 See NAACP, Defending Democracy, supra note 111, at 28–29 (describing examples 
of voter purging in Florida and Mississippi). 
309 See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at 2, 14–15, NAACP v. Harris, No. 01-0120 
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2002), 2002 WL 32961275. 
310 See NAACP, Defending Democracy, supra note 111, at 28–29. A news account sug-
gested that among those purged from Florida’s voter rolls were over ninety World War II 
veterans. See Robbie Brown, Florida’s Approach to Purging Voter Rolls of Noncitizens Prompts 
Federal Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2012, at A17. 
311 See NAACP, Defending Democracy, supra note 111, at 29. 
312 Justin Levitt, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Truth About Voter Fraud 41–42 
n.146 (2007), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/c176576c0065a7eb84_gxm6ib0hl.pdf. 
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Conclusion 
 The VRA is not a panacea for all that ails our democracy. Rather, 
through expansive provisions like Section 2, the VRA answers a discrete 
and compelling question in our multiethnic, multiracial political sys-
tem: how can law protect the electoral process from racial inequality? 
By taking account of the contextual factors that cause disparate vote 
denial, Section 2 challenges to modern voting practices such as voter 
ID requirements, felon disfranchisement, and voter purges can reveal 
areas where racial discrimination has infected the electoral sphere, and 
thus preserve the integrity of the democratic enterprise. The causal 
context test is an effort to realign Section 2 jurisprudence with the pro-
vision’s “core values,” to consider racial context as a cause of disparate 
vote denial, and to recognize implicit bias as evidence of discrimination 
within and outside the electoral arena. Indeed, Section 2 provides 
heightened protection in the electoral arena, even when the underly-
ing discrimination that results in vote denial is not legally cognizable. 
This paradox is a byproduct of the VRA’s overarching purpose to en-
sure an inclusive democracy where race does not determine participa-
tion, while confining its reach to the electoral arena. 
 The narrowing construct of race discrimination claims outside the 
electoral arena ignores substantial racial disparities resulting from state 
action on the premise that discrimination occurs, and is thus action-
able, only when it is intentional or explicit. Accepting contextual evi-
dence of racial discrimination, including implicit bias, is a more accu-
rate, middle-ground approach that recognizes societal discrimination 
without ascribing blame or intent. As our democracy aims to transcend 
its discriminatory past, the causal context analysis thoughtfully navi-
gates its nuanced, race-conscious present toward a stronger, more hon-
est democratic vision. 
